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ABSTRACT
Although empirical evidence consistently finds large premiums 
paid to target firms in acquisitions, the evidence concerning the
acquiring firm is mixed. Some studies show that acquiring stockholders 
earn a significantly positive excess return, others find that the
returns are negative, and still others conclude that acquiring
stockholders earn normal returns like any other investment. There is 
limited evidence concerning the impact of mergers on bondholders of the 
participating firms. Asquith and Kim (1982) indicate that bondholders 
of the merging firms neither gain nor lose from mergers, while Settle et 
al. (1984) finds evidence that bondholders gain from mergers. Thus, 
while there are four separate classes of securityholders involved in 
mergers (1,2) stockholders of the target and bidder firms, respectively, 
and (3,4) bondholders of the target and bidder firms, respectively, 
there is only a consensus regarding the stockholders of the target 
firms.
This study has two major purposes: (a) to re-examine the
returns to the four classes of securityholders around the announcement 
of completed mergers and (b) to attempt to identify the sources of gains 
or losses to each group of securityholders. The first part of the study 
is accomplished by examining returns to both stockholders and 
bondholders around the announcement date of merger. The market model is 
employed for stock returns analysis and the mean adjusted returns 
approach is used in examining bond returns. The sample consists of 579
ix
acquiring and 361 acquired firms for stock returns analysis and 64 and 
29 bonds for the bidder and target firms, respectively. These firms 
were involved in a merger that took place between June 196- and December 
1982. The second part of the study involves the estimation of a 
cross-sectional regression model for each of the four groups of 
securityholders involved in the mergers in the sample. For the 
cross-sectional analysis, we require data on both the acquiring and the 
target firms, and thus the sample is reduced to 204 target and bidder 
firms for which information is available. The excess returns is used as 
independent variable, while the independent variables used in the 
regression analysis are: relative price-earning ratio, relative market
to book value ratio, relative size, relative variance, relative debt 
equity ratio, method of payment, merger type and regulation.
Results from part (a) of the study are, in general, consistent 
with past research. For the equity sample, shareholders of both target 
and bidder gain. For the bond sample, bondholders of the bidder firms 
gain small, but significant excess returns, while the bondholders of the 
target firms do not gain from merger. The cross-sectional model to 
target firm's stockholders indicates that relative variability, method 
of payment and type of merger have a positive sign and are significant 
variables in explaining the excess returns to target stockholders, while 
relative Tobin's Q-ratio is significant and has a negative sign. The 
model has r-square of 21.34 percent and F-value of 6.61. The model to 
bidding firm's stockholders show that relative size and merger type are
x
significant and positively related to the excess returns, while 
regulation is significant and has a negative sign. The model has 
r-square of 12.31 percent and F-value of 3.42.
The cross-sectional model to target bondholders indicate that 
the relative variance, relative price-earning ratio and relative debt 
equity ratio are significant and positively related to the excess 
returns to target bondholders, while the model for bidding firms 
bondholders indicate that relative variance and relative debt-equity 
ratio variables are significant.
xi
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION AND OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY
Numerous studies have been carried out to estimate the effect 
of a merger on the stock price of acquiring and acquired firms during 
the announcement period surrounding a merger proposal. Recent
empirical studies, for example, Asquith (1983), Dodd (1980), Eckbo 
(1983), Asquith, Bruner and Mullins (1983) and Malatesta (1983),
provide evidence which indicates that acquired firms earn
significantly positive abnormal returns on the merger announcement 
through the effective date of merger. The evidence concerning the 
acquiring firms is mixed: some studies, for example, Bradley (1980),
Ellert (1976) and Asquith, Bruner and Mullins (1983), show that the 
acquiring stockholders earn significantly positive returns, while 
others, Dodd (1980), indicate that the returns are negative. Still 
yet, other studies, Asquith and Kim (1982) and Mandelker (1974),
conclude that the acquiring stockholder’s earn normal returns like any 
other investments. Although these empirical findings provide 
extensive evidence regarding the effect of mergers on the stockholders 
of the acquiring and acquired firms, they still have not answered many 
important questions related to the impact of merger.
First: What is the effect of merger on other security holders, 
namely the bondholder of both the acquiring and the acquired firms?
1
This is one of the many questions that will have to be answered. 
Despite the fact that bonds represent a large segment of the security 
market, and that bonds are an important part of the portfolio of many 
institutional firms, there are few studies in the literature which 
examine the bond market response to merger announcements. There is 
only one study (Asquith and Kim (1982)) which considers the effect of 
merger on stockholders and bondholders of the merging firm and another 
published study (Kim and McConnell (1977)) which considers only the 
bondholder's return without including stockholder's return.
The scarcity of empirical research concerning the bond market 
may be due to many reasons, among them:
1. The difficulty of collecting bond prices, since daily or 
monthly bond prices or bond returns are not available on 
tapes like stock prices and stock returns.
2. Many bonds are not traded continuously like stocks, which 
makes it difficult to compute the return on the bonds, and 
also makes it difficult to get a large sample of bonds.
3. Methodological difficulty, since bond returns could be 
related to many indices (bond index, stock index, treasury 
bill index), and it is difficult to specify which market 
index or combination of indices should be used.
The evidence concerning the impact of merger on the merging 
firm seems to indicate that corporate takeovers generate significant 
positive gains, that acquired firm shareholders benefit, and that 
acquiring firm shareholders do not lose. The sources of gain to the 
merging firms have been explained by different hypotheses. One source
of gain is from operating synergies which include economies of scale, 
attainment of monopoly or economic power that stems from bigness, 
efficient utilization of human and physical resources. Another source 
of gain is from financial synergies which include financial leverage, 
tax consideration, undervalued securities, diversification, 
improvement of the marketability of stocks and reduction in business 
risk. If a merger produces the above benefits which will affect the 
value of the firm, then we have to expect to find the same gain to be 
to the bondholder of the merging firms. This argument can be 
explained in the context of the option pricing model (OPM), where 
equity can be viewed as an option on the value of the firm. This 
option is a positive function of the firm's market value. The market 
value of the debt is also a positive function of the value of the 
firm; thus, any increase in the firm's value will be accompanied by an 
increase in the market value of the stocks and bonds, but with 
different magnitude. Given that the OPM is correct, this means that 
the bond market value is an increasing function of the firm's value, 
but it increases with a decreasing rate, and the second derivative is 
negative. This is because the premium (which is the option price 
minus the intrinsic value) of an in-the-money option is smaller than 
of an out-of-the-money option, thus for the same change in market 
value, bond prices will drop by more than they would rise, while the 
opposite is true for stock prices.
Second: The second question to be addressed is whether the
gains from merger are generated at the expense of the bondholder? 
This possibility implies that the stockholder's positive abnormal
returns may simply reflect negative abnormal returns to bondholders, 
or wealth transfer, which arises as a result of conflict of interest 
between bondholders and stockholders. The nature of this conflict has 
been discussed by Black and Scholes (1973), Fama and Miller (1972), 
Galai and Masulis (1976), Jensen and Meckling (1976), Kalay (1982) and 
Smith and Warner (1979). Mainly two different approaches try to 
explain the redistribution of wealth. Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
argue that the acquiring firms stockholders have the incentive to 
acquire firms with high variability to increase the variability of 
their cash flow. The stockholders will gain from the merger while the 
bondholders lose because of the increase in the default risk of the 
existing bonds. Kim and McConnell (1977), Galai and Masulis (1976) 
and Higgins and Schall (1975) argue that merger will produce a wealth 
transfer from the stockholders to the bondholders, since the 
bondholders will receive more protection as a result of merger.
Third: Another question that we will attempt to answer is
what is the determinants of merger gains as explained by different 
hypotheses? While previous empirical studies concluded that, on the 
average, merger produces upward revaluation of the acquired firms 
share price, and little if any gain to the acquiring firm share price, 
these studies do not distinguish between alternative sources of gains 
and the empirical evidence regarding this question is limited. Eckbo 
(1983) and Stillman (1983) found evidence which is inconsistent with 
the market power hypothesis. Walking and Edminster (1985) and 
Papaioannou (1984) found that the leverage, valuation ratio, asset 
turnover ratio, cash flow variability and the relative asset size are
significant variables in explaining the gain to the acquired firms. 
Asquith, Bruner and Mullins (1983) found the relative size, regulation 
and the outcome of the merger proposal are significant variables to 
explain the excess return before the announcement. In this study we 
will try to approximate each hypotheses by a proxy in order to explain 
the relevant factors that may explain the abnormal return to 
securityholders, and to examine the leverage effect hypothesis, price- 
earning ratio hypothesis, undervaluation hypothesis and relative size 
and relative variance.
Another debate in merger literature is whether mergers 
increase the market value of the firm as a result of financial 
synergies. Myers (1968), Schall (1972) and Rubinstein (1973) contend 
that in the absence of real synergies, and in a perfect capital 
market, there are no financial synergies from merger. On the other 
hand, Lewellen (1971) and Lee and Baker (1977) argue that financial 
synergies, which include a reduction in the expected cost of 
bankruptcy, reduction in the agency cost and a reduction in corporate 
taxes, will be created by merger if there are imperfections in the 
capital markets. The empirical evidence concerning that is mixed. 
Elgers and Clark (1980) found that shareholders of both acquiring and 
acquired firms gain more from conglomerate than from non-conglomerate 
merger, while Wansley, Lane and Yang (1983) found that there is no 
significant difference between conglomerate versus non-conglomerate 
for the acquired firm. In fact it is difficult to be certain that any 
class of merger has no operating synergies, but since the third class
of conglomerate, which involves a consolidation of two unrelated 
firms, contains the minimum operating synergies relative to the other, 
this class will be examined relative to other classes to examine 
whether merger produce financial synergies or not.
The method of payment is thought to have a significant impact 
on the gain to merging firm securityholders. Gordon and Yagil (1981) 
and Wansley, Lane and Yang (1983a, 1983b) found that cash merger are 
associated with higher excess return than any other types of payment. 
The regulation effects are also among the variables which have 
negative impact on the return to the acquiring firm and positive 
impact on the return to the acquired firm. Jarrell and Bradley (1980) 
and Schipper and Thompson (1983) both examined the impact of 
regulation on the return to securityholders of the merging firms. All 
of the above mentioned variables will be included to explain the 
determinants of excess return to the merging firms securityholders.
Objective of the Study 
In this study we will consider the impact of merger 
announcement on the return of both bondholders and stockholders on a 
daily basis for all types of merger. In the literature only few 
studies, Asquith and Kim (1982) and Kim and McConnell (1977), examined 
the bondholders return around the effective date of merger.
This study will also consider the impact of other factors 
(i.e., method of payment, type of merger, size, regulation, etc.) on 
the return to bondholders and the determinants of the excess return to
securityholders. The main objectives of this study can be summarized 
by the following points:
1. To examine the impact of merger on the bondholders return 
around merger announcement to see if the bondholders gain 
or loss from merger.
2. To examine the information content of the merger announce­
ment hypotheses versus the wealth distribution hypotheses, 
and determine the direction, if any, of the wealth 
transfer and whether it is due to an incentive or 
diversification effect.
3. To examine the determinants of the excess return to 
security holders as explained by different hypotheses, to 




This chapter will state the hypotheses that will be examined, which 
includes the information content hypotheses, redistribution of wealth 
hypotheses and the hypotheses concerning the motives behind merger and 
the theoretical foundation of including each variable in the cross-
sectional equation to explain the excess return to securityholders.
A. The Information Content Hypotheses
Capital markets are efficient when the stock prices adjust instan­
taneously to new information. Thus bond and stock prices provide 
unbiased signals for efficient allocation of resources. This implies
that if the capital market is efficient with respect to merger announce­
ment, then any information should be reflected instantaneously in the 
corresponding bond and stock prices.
The information content hypotheses states that the information
about the forthcoming merger is considered and interpreted as good news
by the stockholders of the acquiring and acquired firms. The
stockholders of the acquiring firm interpret the merger announcement as
good news because of their expectation of the operating and/or financial
synergies for mergers. The operating synergies include opportunities
for economic of scale, enhancement of the competitive sales through
monopoly power, complementarity in research, physical and human
8
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resources, managerial and administrative efficiency, and reduction of 
business risks. Financial synergies may include the diversification 
effect and increase in the debt capacity. Thus the information content 
hypotheses expects that the return to stockholders of the acquiring firm 
will be positive due to their expectation of the operating and financial 
synergies, and the null hypotheses will be:
Hq ! the returns to stockholders of the acquiring firms will not be 
affected by merger, against the alternative hypothesis.
The stockholders of the acquired firm will also interpret the 
announcements as good news. This is because the premium they will 
receive (as inducement for them to sell their holdings or in exchange 
for the high growth rr unused opportunities) should be dependent on the 
magnitude of the expected operating and financial synergestic benefits 
from merger. Thus the information content hypotheses predicts that the 
acquired firms stockholders' return will be positive and the null 
hypotheses will be:
H^: The return to the target stockholders will not be affectea by
merger announcement against the alternative.
The bondholders of the acquiring and the acquired firm view the 
merger announcement as good news. This is better explained in the 
framework of the option pricing model. Black and Scholes (1973) and 
Galai and Masulis (1976) view the equity as an option on the value of 
the firm. The value of equity is a positive function of the value of 
the firm. Thus any increases in the market value of the firm due to the 
merger will cause an increase in the market value of the debt, but with 
a different magnitude than the stock. In fact, three possible reactions 
of the bond returns are possible.
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1. Bond prices could fully and instantaneously reflect all of the 
information which is contained in the merger announcement, 
which implies that the bond market is efficient.
2. Bond prices respond to the merger announcement in a gradual 
way which implies bond market inefficiency.
3. Bond prices may not react to the merger announcement, which 
means that the information contained in the merger announce­
ment is not relevant to bondholders.
But the bondholders of the merging firms, due to their expectation 
of the operating and financial synergies from the merger (which in­
creases the value of the firm) and due to the functional relationship 
between the market value of the debt and the value of the firm, will be 
affected positively as the information content hypotheses implies. The 
null hypotheses with respect to acquiring firm bondholders is
H^: Return to acquiring firms bondholders will not be affected by
merger announcements, against the alternative.
The null hypotheses to acquired firm bondholders will be:
H^: Return to acquired firms bondholders will not be affected by
merger announcement, against the alternative.
B. Wealth Transfer Hypotheses
The wealth transfer hypotheses stems from the conflict of interest 
between bondholders and stockholders. It implies that an increase 
(decrease) in the equity market value is accompanied by decrease 
(increase) in the debt market value.
Kim and McConnell (1977), Galai and Masulis (1976), and Higgins and 
Schall (1975) argue that a merger will reduce the risk of default of the 
merging firms if the cash flow of the two firms are less than perfectly 
correlated. Because the equity value can be viewed as an option on the 
market value of the debt, by lowering the variance of the equity through
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merger, the option value will decrease. According to the option pricing 
model, the market value of the stock will decrease while the market 
value of the bond will increase, since the bondholders receive more 
protection and the stockholders are hurt because their limited liability 
is weakened. This means that mergers have a diversification effect and 
this effect creates wealth transfers from stockholders to bondholders.
Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that it is impossible for the 
bondholders to be completely protected from the actions of management, 
and it is impossible to specify all the conditions under which they need 
protection. The management has the incentive to expropriate the bond­
holders by undertaking investment projects, or acquiring firms, which 
increases the variability of their firms cash flow. This implies that 
the equity holders may earn positive abnormal returns at the expense of 
bondholders by increasing the riskness of their firms through merger. 
This is termed the incentive effect.
Galai and Masulis (1976), Higgins and Schall (1975) and Kim and 
McConnell (1977) assert that the stockholders of the acquiring firm can 
protect themselves, in the sense that they can offset the decrease in 
their return by retiring all existing debts at their pre-merger market 
price and issuing instead new bonds at the price which is prevailing 
after the merger. Alternatively, the stockholders can protect them­
selves by increasing their use of financial leverage to the point where 
the advantages to bondholders are offset by the disadvantages of in­
creasing the risk of default, and the wealth transfer is cancelled.
Smith and Warner (1979) suggest that bondholders are also able to 
protect themselves by including protective convenants that restrict
12
merger activity, or covenants that allow merger only if the net tangible 
assets of the firm after merger meet a certain dollar minimum or at 
least a certain fraction of long term debt. The merger can also be made 
contingent upon the absence of default of any indenture provision after 
the transactions are completed. Thus the wealth transfer hypotheses 
predicts two types of behavior: the diversification effect and the
incentive effect.
Due to the diversification effect, the bondholders will be affected 
positively while the stockholders will be affected negatively. Due to 
the incentive effect, the stockholders return will increase while the 
bondholders return will decrease. A summary of the predicted response 
of each security holder for the acquiring and the acquired firm for both 
the information content hypotheses and the wealth transfer hypotheses is 
given in Table 2-1.
C. Merger Motives Hypotheses
The empirical evidence on the impact of mergers on the security 
holders return show that the shareholders of the acquired firms earn 
significant abnormal return while the shareholders of the acquiring 
firms earn normal return. This gain has been explained by different 
theoretical hypotheses and empirically tested by different studies. 
Eckbo (1983) examined the effect of regulation on both acquiring and 
acquired firms stockholders, Asquith, Bruner and Mullins (1983) find 
that the size, regulation and the capitalization is a significant factor 
to explain the excess returns to merging firms stockholders, Walking and 
Edmister (1985) and Papaioannou (1984) find that leverage, size and
Table 2.1. Merger announcement effects on security prices 
as predicted by two alternative hypotheses
Hypothesis
Predicted impact on 
bondholders returns
Predicted impact on 
stockholders returns
Predicted impact 











Hypotheses Positive Positive Positive Positive Positive
Wealth Transfer Hypotheses
Diversification effect Positive Positive Negative Negative No Change
Incentive effect Negative Negative Positive Positive No Change
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valuation are significant factors in explaining the excess returns to 
acquired firms stockholders. These studies used different method­
ologies, different variables and different merger types. In this 
section we will look at different hypotheses which explain the motives 
behind merger, and we will approximate each one by a proxy or variable 
to be included in the cross-sectional equation. We will also include 
some control variables to capture the impact of different characteris­
tics of each security.
C*1 Price-Earnings Ratio Hypotheses
Lintner (1971) suggested that when the acquiring firm acquires a 
firm with a lower price earnings ratio (PER) than its own, then the 
market will evaluate the combined earnings of the two firms at a higher 
PER than that of the acquiring firm. (The market does not evaluate the 
two ratios as a weighted average.) The increase in earnings per share 
from PER differences will tend to raise the stockholders assessments of 
the future earnings, and this will lead to an increase in the market 
value of both firms securities.
It is important to mention that this argument implies that the 
shareholders are misled by manipulation of the accounting numbers so 
that the merger announcement is followed by an increase in the stock 
prices of the merging firms, which implies also that the capital markets 
are inefficient. Also, it is possible that the PER could be a proxy of 
size. Reinganum (1981) found that the PER effect disappears when he 
controls for the size, but the size effect is still significant when he 
controls for the PER. This implies that the PER is a proxy of size and
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not vice versa. Both the relative size and the relative PER will be 
included as variables in our model.
If the capital market is efficient, then the relative price earning 
ratio (RPER) must have no value or no explanatory power, but if the 
acquiring firms use this ratio as the criteria for their acquisition, 
then this variable may have explanatory power. The increase in earnings 
per share from PER differences will tend to raise the stockholders 
assessments of the future earnings, and this will lead to an increase in 
the market value of bidder firms stockholders, which implies that the 
relative PER of the target to bidder is positively related to the excess 
returns of acquired firms stockholders and positively related to excess 
returns of acquiring firms stockholders. The predicted impact of 
relative price earning rations on merging firms security holders are 
summarized in Table 2.2.
C.2 Undervaluation Hypotheses
A company may be undervalued for a number of reasons. One is 
because the management is not operating the company to its potential, 
which is one aspect of inefficient management. Another reasons is that 
the bidders have inside information which the general market does not 
have.
Another aspect of the undervaluation hypotheses is that bidders, if 
they wish to obtain or add to capacity in producing a particular 
product, can acquire the additional capacity more cheaply by buying a 
company that produces the products rather than producing the same 
products by their own.
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As a proxy for undervaluation hypotheses we will use the relative 
Tobin's Q-ratio of the target to bidders. The Tobin's Q-ratio is the 
ratio of the market value of the firm in relation to the replacement 
costs of the assets represented by these shares. The relative Tobin's 
Q-ratio is defined as
r t d r = (Market value of Equity/Book Value of Equity) to Target 
(Market value of Equity/Book Value of Equity) to Bidder
A Q-ratio less than one to the target implies that acquiring firm 
can find the additional capacity it needs more cheaply by acquiring that 
target. The argument of this hypotheses implies that the lower the 
market to book value of the target, the higher the expected returns to 
the bidder, which means that there is inverse relationship between 
(RTQR) and the excess return to bidders, and because the size of the 
premium paid to the target is a function of the expected benefits from 
merger, we expect to find this variable positively related to the excess 
returns of the target firms.
If the capital markets are efficient, this ratio have no explana­
tory power unless the acquiring firms have inside information about the 
acquired firm. The predicted effects of the undervaluation hypothesis 
are summarized in Table 2-2.
C .3 Leverage Effect Hypotheses
There are two sources of gain through leverage from merger. 
Lintner (1971) concluded that given the assumption that the merging 
firms already have optimal debt equity ratios in their capital 
structure, merger will reduce the borrowing costs as a result of 
increasing the size.
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Large firms can thus refinance debt of small independent firms 
at lower economic cost, resulting in a genuine capital gain 
through merger (Lintner, 1970, p. 107).
The second source of gain through leverage has been pointed out by 
Lewellen (1971) and Levy and Sarnat (1970). They argue that joining 
together less than perfectly correlated income streams through merger 
will reduce the lenders risk, which implies an increase in debt capacity 
at the same risk. This will lead to an increase in the market value of 
securities of the merging firms.
Shastri (1982) derived a valuation equation of debt and equity of 
the merging firms in which he allowed the acquiring and the acquired 
firms to have different variances, different debt equity ratios and 
different debt maturities. Concerning the leverage effect, his argument 
implies the following:
Let DERg = Debt equity ratio of the acquiring firm 
DER^, = Debt equity ratio of the acquired firm 
then we have the following possibilities of debt equity ratio, combined 





















If DERg > DER^,, then the merger will produce a leverage ratio which is 
greater than DER^ and less than DERg . As a result the bondholders of 
the acquired firm will experience a higher risk of default and the 
market value of their bonds will go down, while the bonds of the 
acquiring firm will increase in market value. Shastri (1982) argues 
that the effect is always negative for the combined common stock and 
that the effect on each individual stock would depend on the terms of 
the merger. The predicted impact of the leverage hypotheses on security 
holders of the merging firms is summarized in Table 2-2.
C.4 Size Effect Hypotheses
The empirical evidence indicates that there is a relationship 
between abnormal returns and size. Reinganum (1981) found that small 
firms earn more than the large firms, and he concluded that the Capital 
Asset Pricing Model is misspecified due to the omission of significant 
anomalies. Banz (1981) also found that smaller firms have higher risk 
adjusted returns, on the average, than larger firms. He suggested that 
the size effect may be used as the basis for a theory of mergers where 
large firms are able to pay a premium for the stock of small firms since 
they will be able to discount the same cash flows at a smaller discount 
rate. The relative size variable will be included to reflect the 
acquiring firms management preference of acquiring firms that are 
relatively large compared to themselves, or what is called 
managerialism. The predicted impact of the size effect is included in 
Table 2.2.
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C.5 Variance Effect Hypotheses
Different authors have different views about the variance effect.
Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that acquiring firms have the incentive
to acquire investment projects or targets with high variability to
create a wealth transfer from the bondholders to stockholders. Galai
and Masulis (1976) contend that in the absence of protective convenants,
and when the returns to merging firms are less than perfectly
correlated, the variance of the acquiring firm will decrease by merger,
causing the value of the stock to decrease and the value of the bonds to
increase by merger. Shastri (1982) allowed the merging firms to have
different variances, so that the combined variance may be less or
greater than the variance of the individual firms. The following
combinations could result:
Let V A R ^  = The variance of the acquiring firm before 
the merger
VAR^^ = The variance of the acquiring firm after 
the merger


































In the first case the combined variance is less than the variance 
of either firm, so the bondholders of both firms will be better off. 
The second case implies that the combined variance may be greater than 
one of the firms and lower than the other.
The variance effect could also reflect management's action to 
maximize the value of their firm by acquiring target firms with lower 
variance to reduce the variability of their firms, which will effect the 
security holders of both firms positively. The relative variability 
will be included as a proxy to capture the variance effect, and the 
predicted sign of the effect is summarized in Table 2.2.
C .6 Method of Payment Effect
The form of payment is thought to have a significant impact on both 
the acquiring firms gain from merger and the premium paid to the target 
firm's security holders, in which cash mergers are associated with 
higher excess return than other forms of payments like exchange of 
securities. Wansley, Lane and Yang (1983) studied different 
explanations concerning this effect, and concluded that the stockholders 
of the acquired firm will require higher premiums in case of cash merger 
since they will pay a capital gain tax in the merger year, and because 
they will give up the expected benefit from merger.
Another aspect of the cash merger is that such mergers are usually 
treated as a purchase in which the goodwill (goodwill is defined as the 
difference between the purchase price and the book value of the acquired 
firms assets), is written off against earnings after taxes, while in 
other types of payment, the mergers are treated as a pooling of
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interest. Pooling treatment of merger implies that the income statement 
and the balance sheet of the merging companies are added together. Many 
managements prefer pooling and pay higher premiums in order to be 
successful in their bids and because they don't like to see the earning 
per share decline if they follow a purchase technique. The higher the 
premium the management pays, along with the higher taxes associated with 
pooling, the lower the cash flow to the acquiring firm and the effect on 
its share prices is negative. Wansley, Lane and Yang (1983) also 
observed that cash mergers are usually completed faster than other forms 
of merger, an effect which will be reflected on the excess return to 
acquiring firms, in the form of reduced legal and administrative costs 
and reduction in the number of bidders.
The empirical evidence concerning the method of payment is very 
limited. Gordon and Yagil (1981) found that the excess return for the
acquiring firm is 7.9% for cash payments and 5.3% in security exchanges,
while it is 31.9% for cash and 18.7% for security exchanges for the 
acquired firm. Wansley, Lane and Yang (1983, 1984) examined the
abnormal returns to acquiring and acquired firms by type of merger and 
method of payment. They found that the cumulative average residual 
(CAR) is 38.68% for cash merger and 25.39% for security exchange. A
significant difference was found for acquired firm, a difference 
attributed to tax effects, accounting effects on earnings and the 
shorter period in performing cash mergers.
Halpern (1983) criticized previous studies on the basis that the 
method of payment may be related to other factors such as the size of 
the acquired firm and the rate of return on the market portfolio. The
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method of payment will be included as a binary variable to test the null 
hypotheses that there is no significant difference between cash merger 
and other forms of payment against the alternative. Table 2.2 indicates 
the predicted impact of method of payment on the securityholders of the 
merging firms.
C.7 Type of Merger Hypotheses
Another issue in merger literature is whether the merger produces 
financial or real synergies. Lewellen (1971) argued that financial 
benefits will result 5n case of imperfect capital market, and that the 
financial benefits are more likely to be related to conglomerate merger 
than non-conglomerate. Schall (1972) and Rubinstein (1973) found that 
in case of perfect capital market and in the absence of real synergies, 
merger will not affect the value of the firm.
The empirical evidence concerning types of merger is very limited. 
Elgers and Clark (1980) examined the effect of merger type on the 
stockholders of the acquired and acquiring firms, using monthly data. 
They found that the shareholders of the merging firms gain more from 
conglomerate than they gain from non-conglomerate. Wansley, Lane and 
Yang (1983, 1984) found that there is no significant difference between 
conglomerate versus non-conglomerate for acquired firms, while they 
found that there is a difference for the acquiring firms.
It is important to mention that previous studies about merger type 
suffer from the arbitrary nature of merger classification schemes, based 
on the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Code, since there is no assurance 
that any class will not produce real synergies. The Federal Trade
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Commission classified each acquisition into the following codes: 1)
Horizontal: companies involved produce one or more of the same, or
closely related products in the same geographic market. 2) Vertical: 
companies Involved had a potential buyer/seller relationship prior to 
the merger. 3) Product extension: companies involved are functionally 
related in production and or distribution but sell products that do not 
compete directly with one another. 4) Market extension: companies
involved manufacture the same products, but sell them in different 
markets. 5) Others: consolidation of two unrelated firms. Categories 
3, 4, and 5 are considered as conglomerate merger. The third class of 
conglomerate which involves a consolidation of two unrelated firms will 
produce the minimum real synergies relative to other classes. Our null 
hypotheses concerning this variable is that there is no difference 
between a pure conglomerate merger and all other types against the 
alternative hypotheses. The predicted signs of this variable are 
summarized in Table 2.2
C.8 Regulation Effect Hypotheses
The effect of regulation is a controversial issue. The advocates 
of regulation argue that target shareholders need protection from 
undesirable mergers, and that regulation provides more information and 
time for shareholders to make their decisions. Those who oppose regu­
lation argue that it will reduce the incentive to engage in acqui­
sitions, which means that the shareholders of the acquired firm will be 
worse off because they will lose the benefits of merger. Also, if 
merger results in more efficient management of the acquired resources,
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then the foregone desirable combination will impose social costs.
Jarrell and Bradley (1980) provided a theory of corporate mergers 
in which corporate mergers provide a market for the acquiring firms to 
exchange the knowledge produced by its highly skilled management. If 
the information produced is specific to the acquired firm, then regu­
lation will cause a leakage of information. Jarrell and Bradley (1980) 
examined the effect of the Williams Amendment of 1968 on the daily 
return of 161 tender offers between 1962 and 1977. They found that the 
premium paid to unregulated targets was 32.4%. This premium was in­
creased to 52.8% by federal regulation and to 73.1% by federal and state 
regulation. The percentage of acquired shares purchased also decreased. 
They concluded that regulation caused the purchase price of the acquired 
firm to increase, the return to the acquiring firm to decrease and to 
reduce the value and the profitability of merger. Schipper and Thompson 
(1983) examined the impact of the Accounting Principles Board's (APA) 
opinions 16 and 17, the 1969 Tax Reform Act and the Williams Amendments. 
They found that these regulatory changes had a significantly adverse 
impact on share values of acquiring firms.
The main two regulations which we will examine are the Williams 
Amendments of July 1968 and December 1970, and the Tax Reform Act of 
December 1969. The first regulation was introduced by Senator Williams 
to regulate the cash tender offer. While the bill has been criticized 
on the basis that it would raise the cost of acquisition and that it is 
against competition, it was passed in July 1968. The second bill, which 
provided more restriction on the action of the acquiring firm, was
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approved and passed in December 1970. The first amendment requires the 
acquiring firm to:
1. File statements about the offer and their plans for the
acquired firm;
2. Pay to all tenderors the highest price offered to any
tenderor;
3. Allow tenderors a fixed period to withdraw tendered
securities;
4. Purchase shares on a prorate basis if the numbers tendered 
during the first ten days exceeds the number of acquiring 
wishes to purchase. Also the acquired management has the
right to sue to delay the tender offer.
The second amendment tightens the regulation of the first one and
extends them to stocks for stock tender offers. The 1969 Tax Reform 
Act, presented by President Johnson in January 1969, was signed by 
President Nixon in December 1969. It disallows the interest deduction
on convertible bonds issued to effect merger.
Previous studies provided the justification to include the regu­
latory changes as a factor to describe the excess return for both the 
acquiring and acquired firms. Since this effect will be translated into 
excess return to the merging firm, and while previous studies do not 
examine the impact of these changes on the return to bondholders of the 
merging firms, we will include it as a factor to describe the excess 
returns to the bondholders.. We expect to find this factor positively 
related to security holders of the acquired firm and negatively related 
with excess returns of the acquiring security holders. Since the period 
after July 1968 can be described as a regulatory period following the 
first and second amendments and the APB's opinions approved after July 
1968, one dummy variable will be included to account for these effects.
Table 2-2. The Predicted Impact of Mergers Motive Hypothesis 
on the Securityholders of the Merging Firms
Hypotheses to be Examined Symbol
Acquiree1 Firms Acquiring Firms
Stockholders Bondholders Stockholders Bondholders
1) Relative Price Earning Ratio RPER Positive Positive Positive Positive
2) Relative Tobin's Q-Ratio RTQR Positive Positive Positive Positive
3) Relative Debt-Equity Ratio RDER
A - Debt Capacity Effect Positive Positive Positive Positive
B - Wealth Transfer
Effect:
If DER > DER,^ Positive/ Negative Positive/ Positive
D 1 Negative, Negative
If DER^ < DERT Positive/ Positive Positive/ Negative
D i Negative Negative
4) Relative Size RSIZE Positive Positive Negative Negative
5) Relative Variance RVAR
A - Diversification Positive Positive Positive Positive
B - Wealth Transfer
If VARbb, VARt > VARba Negative Positive Negative Positive
If VARfc > VARfea > V A R ^ Negative Positive Positive Negative
If VARt < V A R ^  < V A R ^ Positive Negative Negative Positive
6) Method of Payment MPAY Positive — Positive —
7) Type of Merger MTYP Positive — Positive —
8) Regulation REGUL Positive — Negative —
CHAPTER 3
REVIEW OF LITERATURE
This chapter encompasses a survey of previous empirical research on 
the impact of merger announcements on the returns to acquiring and 
acquired firms. The first section of the chapter reviews the empirical 
work that examined the returns to stockholders of both acquiring and 
acquired firms around merger announcements. The second section is 
devoted to empirical research that examined determinants and factors 
which affects the excess return to stockholders of the merging firms. 
The third section reviews and evaluates studies that examined returns to 
bondholders and stockholders around merger announcements. The fourth 
section is devoted to past empirical research in the area of wealth 
transfer and informational effects. The final section is a summary of 
the chapter.
Gain to Stockholders of the Merging Firms
Numerous studies have estimated the effects of mergers and tender 
offers on stock prices of the participating firms. The previous empiri­
cal work investigates (a) the magnitude of the gains from merger to 
stockholders of acquiring and acquired firms; (b) whether opposition to 
the merger proposal by management of the acquired firms reduces the
stockholders wealth; (c) the impact of regulation, which restricts the
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action of the acquiring firms, on the returns to participating firms; 
and (d) whether mergers create a market power. These are among many 
questions that previous research attempted to answer.
Mandelker (1974) investigated the impact of mergers on the returns 
to the stockholders of the acquired and acquiring firms. The two basic 
assumptions examined are the perfectly competitive acquisition market 
hypotheses, which implies that for an acquiring firm there are no mono­
polistic source of gains due solely to merger. This is because
competition will equate the expected rates of returns on assets of 
similar risk and if the acquisitions market offers higher expected 
returns than equivalent activities of similar risk, more resources will 
be directed to this activity until expected rates of return are reduced 
to a competitive level. The second hypotheses is the efficient capital 
market hypotheses with respect to information on acquisitions.
Mandelker employed the two-factor market model to generate 
residuals for forty-months before and after the effective month of
merger. The procedure was used for both acquiring and acquired firms 
for the period from 1948 to 1967. His findings indicate that the stock­
holders of the acquiring firms earn a normal return from mergers like 
any other investment with the same risk level. The stockholders of 
acquired firms earn abnormal returns of approximately 14% on the
average, in the seven months preceding the merger. He concluded that
his findings are consistent with the perfectly competitive acquisitions 
market hypotheses and with the hypotheses that information regarding 
mergers is efficiently incorporated in the stock prices. These results
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are also consistent with the idea that stockholders are not misled by 
accounting manipulations or by the artificial increase in earnings per 
share that results from different price-earning ratios. The positive 
abnormal return to the acquiring stockholders is consistent with the 
hypotheses that the acquiring firms operate in a perfectly competitive 
market, in that the prices they pay for the acquired firms enable their 
stockholders to earn normal returns.
Dodd (1980) examined the market reaction to the merger announcement 
and subsequent acceptance or rejection of merger proposals. The market 
model methodology was used with a sample of 151 merger proposals. Of 
this number, 71 were completed and 80 were cancelled after the initial 
announcement. He found that the stockholders of the acquired firms gain 
large positive abnormal returns regardless of the outcome of the pro­
posal (whether it is accepted or rejected) and on average shareholders 
earn approximately 13% excess return.
For merger proposals that are completed, the acquired stockholders 
earn 33.96% excess returns over 10 days before through 10 days after the 
approval by acquired stockholders, while for merger proposals that are 
cancelled, the acquired stockholders earn a significant negative excess 
return 10 days before and 10 days after the termination day. Stock­
holders of the acquiring firms earn negative excess returns regardless 
of the outcome of the proposal. For cancelled merger proposals the 
returns are -7.22% while for completed merger proposals the returns 
total -5.5%.
Dodd (1980) observed that because the excess return to the acquired 
stockholders is positive irrespective of the outcome of the proposal,
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this can be taken as evidence that the managers act in the interest of 
shareholders when they veto the proposed merger. Copeland and Weston 
(1983) provided an additional explanation of Dodd's findings. They 
suggest that the rejection of the merger proposal by the acquired firm 
could be taken as signal by the market that the acquiring firm has 
uncovered a profitable opportunity or there is a better bid, while the 
rejection by the acquiring firm could be considered as a signal that the 
acquired firm represents a bad deal and the deal does not represent a 
profitable opportunity.
Bradley (1980) examine the impact of cash tender offers on the 
return to both acquiring and acquired firms for both accepted and 
rejected offers. He studied a sample of 258 cash tender offers that 
occurred between 1962-1977. Out of these, 97 were rejected by the 
stockholders of the acquired firm and 161 were accepted.
Bradley (1980) finds that the acquired firms stockholders gain a 
significant positive abnormal return in case of successful and unsuc­
cessful tender offers. The acquiring stockholders realize an excess 
return of 5%, which is consistent with a synegistic benefit from merger. 
In the case of an unsuccessful offer, the acquiring firms stockholders 
realize a negative abnormal returns which Bradley attributed to search 
and administrative costs of the offer.
Asquith (1983) investigates the effect of merger bids on the stock 
returns of both acquiring and acquired firms. Excess returns are 
examined throughout the entire merger process for both successful and 
unsuccessful merger bids. The sample of successful mergers consists of 
211 acquired firms and 196 acquiring firms, while the sample of
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unsuccessful mergers consists of 91 acquired firms and 89 acquiring 
firms. The entire sample was taken over the period of July 1962 through 
December 1976.
Daily excess returns are calculated using the daily CRSP excess 
return file. Asquith finds that in both successful and unsuccessful 
mergers, the acquired firm’s stockholders realize positive and signifi­
cant average excess returns on the press day and the day before. At the 
outcome date for successful mergers there are significantly positive 
excess returns, while for unsuccessful acquired firms, there are sig­
nificantly negative excess returns. He also finds that in both success­
ful and unsuccessful mergers, the acquiring firm’s stockholders realize 
a small positive, but statistically insignificant, excess return at the 
announcement date. At the effective date, for successful mergers, the 
stockholders realize small positive excess returns, while for unsuccess­
ful mergers, there are small negative excess returns, but both are 
statistically insignificant. During the interim period, the cumulative 
excess return is negative and statistically insignificant for successful 
mergers, while it is negative and statistically significant for unsuc­
cessful mergers, to the bidding firm stockholders.
Asquith concludes that these results are consistent with the 
hypotheses that acquired firms have unique resources that provide 
synergy when combined with other firms.,
Malatesta (1983) examines the effect of mergers on shareholder 
wealth. A distinctive feature of Malatesta's study is the calculation 
of the dollar wealth effects of mergers by the abnormal returns in 
addition to percentage returns. He also defines the first date as the
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time when investors learn that the firm will engage in merger activity, 
and the second date as the resolution date. The ex post Capital Asset 
Pricing Model (CAPM), with the intercept allowed to vary, is used to 
generate the abnormal returns 24 months before and 12 months after the 
merger. The data included large mergers as reported by the Federal
Trade Commission from 1969 to 1974. The total sample was 256 acquiring 
and 85 acquired firms.
Malatesta finds that the percentage returns to acquiring stock­
holders are insignificantly different from zero before the first date
and are significantly negative after the first and second announcement 
dates. The dollar return for this group indicated a cumulative excess 
negative return of $49.3 million per firm 24 months before the second 
date. He also finds that acquired firms earned significantly negative 
returns (in terms of percentage) from 24 to 4 months before the first 
announcement. The returns become positive and statistically significant 
after the first and the second date. In terms of dollar returns, the 
acquired stockholders have significant positive abnormal return of $19.2 
million 4 months before the second date. Malatesta's results are 
consistent with the hypotheses that mergers have a positive impact on 
acquired firm stockholders.
Asquith, Bruner and Mullins (1983) also examine the impact of
merger announcement on the wealth of the acquiring firms shareholders. 
Their data consisted of 156 acquiring firms which initiated a merger 
program between 1963-1979. The daily excess returns are calculated
using a technique developed by Myron Scholes (1976) for the Center for
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Research in Security Prices (CRSP), and the excess returns is taken from 
the daily (CRSP) excess returns file.
Asquith, Bruner and Mullins examine four different hypotheses: (1)
acquiring firms shareholders benefit from mergers; (2) the effect of 
merger announcement on the firms which initiate the merger programs 
should be observed early in a merger program and decrease with succeed­
ing mergers; (3) abnormal returns to acquiring firms should reflect the 
relative size of the acquiring and acquired firm; and (4) the return to 
acquiring firm is affected by regulation. They find that the acquiring 
firms shareholders benefit from mergers. The average excess return was 
found to be 2.8%, with a t-statistic of 5.2. Larger excess returns were 
found when they controlled for acquired firm size and for the time 
period in which the bid occurred. A statistically significant relation­
ship was found between the acquiring firms cumulative excess return and 
the relative size of the acquired firms equity.
The excess return for successful mergers was found to be 4% greater 
than unsuccessful merger bids, and the excess return prior to 1969 were 
2.6% higher than the excess return after 1969. They did not find evi­
dence to support the hypotheses that the benefits from mergers are 
reflected in the stock prices at the announcement of a merger program.
Studies Examining the Determinants of Excess 
Returns to Securityholders
In this section we will discuss the empirical work which examined 
other factors such as method of payment, type of merger, the regulation 
effect, the size effect, and how these factors affect the returns to the 
securityholders of the merging firms.
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Wansley, Lane and Yang (1983) examined the abnormal returns to 
stockholders of acquired firms around the announcement day of merger. 
They tested for differences in return after controlling for the method 
of payment (cash, security or combination) and the type of merger 
(non-conglomerate, pure conglomerate, or other conglomerate). Their 
results indicate that there is no significant difference in return to 
acquired firms stockholders across merger types, while there is a 
significant difference between cash mergers and other methods of pay­
ment. This difference was attributed to the tax effect and to regu­
latory requirements that prefer cash as the method of payment.
Elgers and Clark (1980) examined the return to the buyer and seller 
firms 24 months before and after the announcement month. They also 
examined the differences in returns between conglomerate and non­
conglomerate mergers, and between pure conglomerate and other types of 
conglomerate mergers. The market model was employed to estimate the 
excess return around the merger month for 337 mergers between 1957 and
1975. Their findings show that the acquired firm earns positively 
significant abnormal return around the merger month. They also found 
that conglomerate mergers provide higher returns to the acquiring firm; 
the difference is larger if the pure conglomerate mergers are isolated. 
Conglomerate mergers were also found to provide higher returns to 
acquiring firms stockholders than non-conglomerate mergers. Their 
evidence concerning merger types suggests that the debt capacity 
rationale for conglomerate merger does not distinguish between con­
glomerate and other merger types.
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Walking and Edmister (1985) analyzed the determinates of bid 
premiums using 108 cash tender offers between 1972 and 1977. Their main 
hypotheses was that premium size measured as the percentage difference 
between the bid price specified in the offer and the market price 14 
days prior to the earliest offer announcement is positively related to 
the expected benefits from merger and negatively related to the 
acquiring firm's bargaining power. Their model includes such variables 
as the trend in debt to assets ratio for the acquired firm, the trend in 
net working capital to assets ratio, the ratio of market to book value, 
the percentage of the acquired shares controlled by the acquiring firm, 
conglomerate versus non-conglomerate merger, and contested versus 
uncontested offers.
Their results indicate that higher premiums are offered for firms 
with declining amounts of leverage and for firms where the market to 
book ratio is relatively low. Other variables which turned out to be 
statistically significant are the variable which indicates if there is 
an opposing suitor at the time of a bidder's last offer revision, the 
variable which measures the percentage of the acquiring firm's shares 
controlled by the bidder prior to the offer and a variable which indi­
cates whether the bid will give more than 50% control to the acquiring 
firm. The model explained over 37% of the variation in bid premiums.
Papaioannou (1984) examined empirically the merger related premiums 
for acquired firms in a sample of 53 pure conglomerate mergers occurring 
between 1964 and 1975. A number of variables was selected to test the 
financial and managerial synergy hypotheses and the managerial welfare 
maximization hypotheses. These variables included a profitability
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ratio, an asset turnover ratio, a liquidity ratio, debt ratio, cash flow 
correlation of the target with the bidder, sales growth rate, cash flow 
variability, asset size relative, price earnings ratio, and the val­
uation ratio. The results indicate that the acquired firms seem to 
represent less efficiently managed firms because of their lower profita­
bility, higher liquidity and leverage underutilization. The two other 
significant variables— the cash flow variability and the asset size 
relative— have negative and positive signs, respectively, which can be 
taken as evidence in support of the managerial welfare maximization 
hypothesis.
Jarrell and Bradley (1980) examined the effect of regulation on the 
returns to acquiring and acquired firms by looking closely at the impact 
of the Williams Amendment of 1968 on the daily returns of 161 tender 
offers between 1962 and 1977. They found that the premium paid to 
unregulated acquiring firms was 32.4%. This premium was increased to 
52.8% by federal regulation and to 73% by both federal and state regu­
lation. They conclude that regulation caused the purchase price of the 
acquired firm to increase, the return to the acquiring firm to decrease 
and a reduction in the value and profitability of mergers.
Schipper and Thompson (1983) investigated the impact of the Ac­
counting Principles Board's opinions 16 and 17, the Tax Reform Act and 
the Williams Amendments. They found that these regulatory changes had a 
significantly adverse impact on share values of acquiring firms.
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Studies Examining the Return to Bondholders 
Around Merger Announcement
In this section we will review and evaluate the previous empirical 
studies which examined the return to bondholders of the merging firms. 
Only one published work has examined the returns to both bondholders and 
stockholders, and another study has examined the return to bondholders 
alone.
Kim and McConnell (1977) examined whether the bondholders of 
merging firms earn positive abnormal returns due to merger'.!. They also 
examined the use of financial leverage by the merging firms to find out 
if the shareholders are able to protect themselves from a wealth trans­
fer to bondholders by increasing the use of financial leverage. They 
employed a paired comparison procedure to generate abnormal return 
around the merger announcement month. The procedure involves a compari­
son of one bond issued by a nonmerging firm with each of the bonds 
issued by a sample of merging firms matched on different characteris­
tics. The second methodology they used is the two-index market model, 
which includes the stock market index and the corporate bond index. 
Their data consisted of 31 observations on a monthly basis for the 
period between January 1960 and December 1973.
Kim and McConnell find that the bondholders of merging firms do not 
earn abnormal returns during the 24 months around the merger announce­
ment; they also find that using different measures of financial leverage 
before and after the merger, merging firms increased the use of finan­
cial leverage after the merger took place. They argued that these 
results are consistent with the hypotheses that the wealth transfer from
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stockholders to bondholders has been cancelled by the Increased use of 
leverage. These findings are also consistent with the idea that manage­
ments act in the best interest of the stockholders.
While the results of Kim and McConnell (1977) are consistent with 
their hypothesis, their evidence can be considered suggestive at best
and does not provide the basis for strong generalizations because of the
following:
1. They use monthly data instead of daily data, which are not as 
sensitive in distinguishing changes in securityholder's wealth 
as are daily return.
2. They use the effective date of merger as the event date, which 
is not as accurate as the announcement date in analyzing the 
security market's reaction to mergers. Also, the time lag 
between the announcement date and the effective date creates 
noise so that the statistical test may not detect the sys­
tematic movement in the security prices, if any.
3. The paired comparison procedure creates problems which affect 
their results, since in many cases there was no matching. In 
addition, they match industrial bonds with utility bonds,
which means that the average and the cumulative average 
difference do not reflect the impact of merger on the bond 
returns.
4. Using the two factor market model procedure to generate 
abnormal performance for bonds causes a serious problem since 
the assumption of equal variance, normality and no serial
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correlation between the residual will not be satisfied, as 
indicated by Alexander (1980).
5. The sample was very small (31 bonds for both acquiring and 
acquired firms) and no distribution free test or non para­
metric test was carried out to determine the significance of 
their results.
Asquith and Kim (1982) examined the return to bondholders and 
stockholders of the merging firms. A paired comparison technique was 
used to generate abnormal returns around merger announcement. Their 
sample consisted of 28 acquiring and 22 acquired firms engaged in a pure
conglomerate merger between January 1, 1980 and December 31, 1978, in
which each firm had bonds outstanding. They found that the stockholders 
of the merging firms gained as a whole from merger implying that the 
synergistic benefits from merger (whether it is operating or financial) 
do not depend on the type of merger.
The bondholders do not earn positive or negative abnormal returns, 
which implies that the wealth transfer (if it occurs) could be negated 
by other affects of the diversification and incentive effects may cancel 
each other. Asquith and Kim argue that these findings are consistent 
with a market that efficiently resolves that conflicts of interest
between stockholders and bondholders.
Their study can be criticized on the following bases:
1. The total sample of bonds for both acquiring and acquired
firms (50 observations) was too small to draw any conclusions 
concerning bondholder returns. This sample was further
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reduced to 17 observations (6 acquired and 11 acquiring firms) 
when they calculated the daily bond return.
2. The use of the paired comparison procedure creates a problem 
since 9 observations out of 17 lost their matching. This also 
means that the average and cumulative average differences do 
not capture the impact of merger announcement on bondholder 
returns. Additionally Asquith and Kim (1982) ran the same
analyses on the bond data that are used by Kim and McConnell
(1977), and they found that in many cases bondholders gain a 
significant return around merger announcement. Thus, while 
the same data set was included in their sample, they obtained 
different results, which makes their findings questionable.
Settle, Petry and Hsia (1984) examined the impact of merger on the 
return to bondholders of the merging firms. Their data consisted of 90 
bonds for both acquiring and acquired firms, from 58 firms in 53 mergers 
between January 1961 and December 1977. They employed the mean adjusted 
returns to generate residuals nine months before thru nine months after 
the effective month of merger. They find that bondholders do gain
significantly positive abnormal returns around the actual date of
merger, which implies that the effective date is the relevant one to use 
in examining the effect of merger on securityholders.
Concerning this study, the following points must be mentioned:
1. They mixed bonds issued by the bidder and that issued by the 
targets even though each bondholders may have different effect 
as a results of merger.
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2. While they examined the return to bondholders, they did not 
examine the corresponding return to stockholders to find out 
if the gain to bondholders came at the expense of other 
securityholders.
3. They use the effective date of merger as the event date, which 
is not as accurate as the announcement date in analyzing the 
security market’s reaction to merger.
Event Studies Examining Wealth Transfer Between 
Bondholders and Stockholders
In this section, we will review the empirical work that examined 
the impact of different events (i.e., dividend announcements, exchange 
offer announcements, and spin off announcements) on bondholders returns 
and the wealth transfer hypotheses.
Masulis (1980) examined the impact of capital structure change 
announcements on bondholders and stockholders for the case of exchange 
offers. The study examined the corporate taxes, bankruptcy cost and the 
wealth transfer hypotheses for cases in which debt exchanged for common 
stock, preferred stock is exchanged for common stock and debt is ex­
changed for preferred stock.
Masulis (1980) argued that the exchange of debt for common stock 
will cause outstanding debtholders to bear an adverse redistribution of 
wealth because of incomplete protective covenants, while stockholders 
gain because a part of their junior claims are converted into senior 
claims of greater market value. The exchange of debt for preferred 
stock will cause the preferred stockholders to be better off at the 
expense of the outstanding debtholders. This is because preferred
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stockholders are able to convert part of their lower priority holdings 
for higher priority debt claims.
Masulis employed comparison period returns approach to generate 
returns for 21 trading days around the exchange offer announcement for 
both convertible and non convertible bonds. His bond data included 47 
convertible bonds representing 32 exchange offers and 49 non convertible 
bonds issues representing 26 exchange offers for the period from 1962 to
1976. He found that the portfolio daily returns of non convertible 
bonds experience a loss of 0.3 percent with a t-statistic equal to 3.1 
for the two-day announcement period. This is consistent with Masulis' 
(1980) prediction of negative bankruptcy cost and redistribution ef­
fects .
Dann (1981) examined the effect of a common stock repurchase on the 
value of the repurchasing firm's common stock, debt and preferred stock. 
The comparison period return approach was applied to a sample of 41 
issues of straight debt, 34 issues of convertible debt, 9 issues of 
straight preferred and 38 convertible preferred stocks. He examined 
both the information content hypotheses and the wealth transfer hypothe­
ses. The results indicated that the combined returns for day 0 and day 
1 are positive for convertible debt, straight preferred and convertible 
preferred, and slightly negative for straight debt. These results 
indicate that wealth losses for owners of senior securities arising from 
the repurchase of common stock by the firm is not supported. The 
evidence is consistent with the information content hypothesis.
Hite and Owers (1983) and Schipper and Smith (1983) investigated 
the effect of voluntary corporate spin-off announcements on shareholders
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wealth. Hite and Owers used a variant of the comparison period return 
to generate excess returns from a sample of 123 spin-offs from 1963 to 
1981, only 31 firms with a total of 53 publicly traded issues were 
found. These consisted of 15 straight bonds, 17 convertible bonds, 5 
straight preferred stocks, and 16 convertible preferred stocks.
The cumulative excess return 10 days before the announcement date 
was found to be -0.003 with a t-statistic of -0.03, which is not signifi­
cant. The excess return to other senior securities was also found to be 
insignificant. These findings led them to conclude that the excess 
return to stockholders does not come at the expense of other security­
holders, evidence not consistent with the wealth transfer hypotheses.
Schipper and Smith (1983) examined bond prices and bond rating 
behavior around spin-off announcements to provide evidence regarding the 
likelihood of wealth transfer from bondholders to stockholders. For a 
sample of 62 spin-offs which experienced positive abnormal returns and 
which had 26 bonds outstanding, 13 bonds experienced price increases and 
11 experienced price decreases. They also found that only 2 out of 19 
bonds experienced a decline in bond rating the year after the spin-off. 
Schipper and Smith concluded that there is no evidence of a wealth 
transfer from bondholders to stockholders, which is consistent with the 
view that bondholders anticipate and attempt to control wealth transfers 
to shareholders.
Handjinicolaou and Kalay (1984) examined the impact of dividend 
announcement (unexpectedly high and unexpectedly low dividend changes) 
on both bondholders and stockholders returns of the underlying firm. 
Specifically, they examined both information content and wealth transfer
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hypotheses. They argued that both the information content and wealth 
transfer hypotheses predict that stock prices will react favorably to 
announcement of high dividends. For bond prices the information content 
hypotheses predicts that bond prices will react favorably to dividend 
increase announcements, while the wealth transfer hypotheses predicts 
that bond prices will react negatively to high dividend announcements.
Handjinicolaou and Kalay employed the comparison period return 
methodology to estimate excess returns for period 60 days before through 
15 days after the dividend announcement. Their sample consisted of 225 
straight bonds traded during 1975 to 1976.
The empirical evidence indicates that the bond prices are not 
affected by dividend increases but react negatively to dividend de­
creases, which is consistent with the information content hypotheses. 
The gain from positive information accrues to stockholders while losses 
from negative information are shared by stockholders and bondholders.
Summary
While a large number of studies exist that examine returns to 
merging firms stockholders, these studies are different in different 
dimensions. Some studies used daily data while others used monthly 
data. Some used the announcement date as the relevant date while others 
used the effective date. The methodologies, time period covered, and 
the hypotheses examined were also different.
Despite all these differences, the evidence indicates that acquired 
firms stockholders in successful mergers and tender offers gain signifi­
cantly positive abnormal returns on the announcement date through the
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effective date, while acquired firm's stockholders, in the case of 
unsuccessful mergers, lose all the positive returns earned on the 
announcement date by the time when failure becomes known.
The acquiring firm's stockholders earn positive abnormal returns in 
case of successful mergers and negative abnormal returns in case of 
unsuccessful efforts in both mergers and tender offers.
Studies that examined the determinants of abnormal return to 
stockholders found that factors like the relative size of acquiring and 
acquired firms, debt equity ratio, valuation ratio, method of payment, 
and the regulation effect are significant factors in explaining the 
excess return to stockholders of the merging firms.
The limited number of studies which examined the return to bond­
holders around merger date find no evidence to support the wealth 
transfer hypothesis between bondholders and stockholders. It was also 
found that bondholders are affected little, if any, by mergers.
CHAPTER 4
DATA DESCRIPTION AND METHOD OF ANALYSIS
This study examines bond and stock price behavior around merger 
announcements for both acquiring and acquired firms. It also investi­
gates the factors that may explain the excess returns to securityholders 
of the merging firms.
Thus, to examine the returns to stockholders of merging firms we 
need two samples, one for the acquiring firms and the other for acquired 
firms. To examine the returns to bondholders we also need two samples, 
one related to the bondholders of the acquiring firms and the second 
related to the bondholders of the acquired firms.
The cross-sectional model will include the excess return defined in 
two ways; the cumulative excess returns from twenty days prior to and 
including the announcement day and the sum of day (-1) and day zero 
average returns as the dependents variable and the factors which may 
explain the return as independent variables.
This chapter is divided into three sections. In the first section 
we will describe the stock data including the sample of acquiring and 
acquired firms. We will explain the method of analysis and the proce­
dure used to estimate the excess return to stockholders of acquiring and 
acquired firms. The second section is a description of the sampling
procedure of the bond samples and the methodology used to generate
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excess returns to bondholders of acquiring and acquired firms. The 
third section is a description of the variables that are used in the 
cross-sectional equation and the method of analysis of these variables.
Stock Data Description
In order to construct our sample of stock returns to acquiring and 
acquired firms stockholders, we followed the steps outlined below.
Determining the study period. A study period from June 1962
through December 1982 was chosen. June 1962 was taken as a starting
point because the data available on the CRSP— Center for Research in 
Security Prices— tapes begins in June 1962. December 1982 was chosen as 
the end of the study period because data were available on the CRSP 
tapes up to 1982 when the collection of data was started.
Daily returns versus monthly returns. Daily returns are used to 
examine the returns to securityholders of the merging firms instead of
monthly returns because monthly returns are not as sensitive in distin­
guishing changes in shareholder's wealth as are the daily returns.
It is important to mention that the use of daily data is complicat­
ed by the fact that daily stock returns depart more from normality than
do monthly returns. (See Fama, 1976.) In addition, the estimation of
parameters from daily date is complicated by nonsynchronous trading, 
which will cause the ordinary least squares estimates of the market 
model parameters to be biased and inconsistent. (See Scholes and 
Williams, 1977.) As a consequence of nonsynchronous trading, the daily 
excess returns could exhibit serial dependence. Another problem is that
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the variance of the stock returns increases for the days immediately 
around events. Brown and Warner (1980a, 1984b) investigated the event 
study methodologies using monthly and daily data. Concerning the 
problems associated with daily returns, they indicated that the degree 
of misspecification in the event study methodologies is sensitive to the 
sample size. As we increase the sample we will approach normality, and 
since our sample is large (361 acquired and 579 acquiring firms), we 
will not encounter this problem. Brown and Warner (1984b) also found 
that failure to take into account nonsynchronous trading in estimating 
the market model parameters does not result in misspecification of event 
study methodologies using the ordinary least squares (OLS) market model. 
They also found that the rejection rates using both Scholes and 
Williams' (1977) or Dimson’s (1977) procedure are similar to the results 
obtained with the OLS market model, and thus there is no evidence that 
any procedure other than OLS will improve the specification or the power 
of the tests.
Announcement date versus effective date. We selected the first 
public announcement as mentioned in the Wall Street Journal Index to be 
the event date. Brown and Warner (1980), Dodd (1980) and Asquith (1983) 
indicate that the announcement date is the relevant date to analyze 
stock market reaction to mergers. The time lag between the announcement 
date and the effective date, which varies from one merger to another, 
could create noise which will cause the statistical test not to capture 
any existing systematic movements in the security prices.
Source of the announcement. The sample includes only completed 
mergers that are listed in the Federal Trade Commission as large merger
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series. The effective date, method of payment and type of merger for 
the period between June 1962 and December 1979 was taken from the 
Federal Trade Commission Statistical Report on Mergers and Acquisitions. 
Data for the period between January 1979 and December 1982 was taken 
from Mergers and Acquisitions journal. Merger announcement dates were 
collected through the Wall Street Journal Index and both the effective 
date and method of payment were verified from the Wall Street Journal 
Index.
Obtaining the returns around announcement date. To be included in 
the study, both acquiring and acquired firms must have available daily 
returns on the CRSP daily returns file from 220 days prior to the 
announcement date through 20 days after the announcement date of merger. 
Companies that are included in this study must satisfy the following 
criteria:
1. The announcement date occurred between June 1962 and December 
1982.
2. They are listed in the Federal Trade Commission large merger 
series (for the announcements between 1962 and 1979), and in 
Mergers and Acquisitions (for the announcements which occurred 
between 1979 and 1982).
3. The. company must have available daily returns on the CRSP 
daily returns file from 220 days prior to the announcement 
date to 20 days after.
A total of 361 acquired, and 579 acquiring firms satisfied the 
previous conditions. Table 4-1 indicates the initial sample and the 
subsequent reasons for deletion of both acquiring and acquired firms.
50
Table 4-1
Initial Sample and Subsequent Reasons for Deletion: 
Acquired and Acquiring Firms
Reason for Deletion Acquired Firms Acquiring Firms
Initial Sample 1260 1260
Company not listed 
on CRSP tape 720 480
Insufficient CRSP 
data 109 96
Bad return on the 
announcement day 47 63
Announcement occurred 
before 1962 23 42
Total number of 
firms deleted 899 681
Final Sample 361 579
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Table 4-2 shows the frequency distribution of the acquired firms sample 
by the announcement year, the total sample of 361 announcement is 
divided by the method of payment into cash, securities and combination 
over a 20 year period. Table 4-3 and 4-4 indicate that 39.34% of the 
targets were acquired through cash, 50.69% by securities exchange and 
9.97% by a combination of cash and securities. Table 4-3 also shows 
that after 1974, the cash as a medium of exchange increased relative to 
securities exchange. Table 4-5 provides a frequency distribution of the 
acquired firms sample by type of merger. It shows 84.51% conglomerate 
relative to 15.5% non-conglomerate mergers.
Table 4-6 shows the frequency distribution of 579 acquiring firms 
by the announcement year. Table 4-7 provides frequency distribution of 
the acquiring firms by method of payment. It shows that 55.78% of the 
sample performed by securities exchange, 35.58% by cash and 8.63 by 
combination. Table 4-7 shows the increasing usage of cash as medium of 
exchange relative to securities exchange over time. Table 4-9 provide 
frequency distribution of the acquiring firms sample by type of merger. 
The table shows that 19.34% of the acquisitions are nonconglomerate 























Frequency Distribution of the Acquired Firms Sample
by Announcement Year
Cumulative Cumulative
Frequency Frequency Percent Percent
7 7 1.939 1.939
15 22 4.155 6.094
22 44 6.094 12.188
15 59 4.155 16.343
38 97 10.526 26.870
38 135 10.526 36.396
10 145 2.770 40.166
14 159 3.878 44.044
7 166 1.939 45.983
8 164 2.216 48.199
13 187 3.601 51.801
14 201 3.878 55.679
13 214 3.601 59.280
15 229 4.155 63.435
26 255 7.202 70.637
21 276 5.817 76.454
16 292 4.432 80.886
28 320 7.756 88.643
27 347 7.479 96.122






















Frequency Distribution of the Acquired Firms Sample by Method of Payment
and the Announcement Year
Cash Securities Combination Total
















































































Frequency Distribution of the Acquired Firms Sample
by Method of Payment
Method Cumulative Cumulative
of Payment Frequency Frequency Percent Percent
Cash 142 142 39.335 39.335
Securities 183 325 50.693 90.028
Combination 36 361 9.972 100.00
Table 4-5
Frequency Distribution of the Acquired Firms Sample 
by Type of Merger



































63 7 7 1.209 1.209
64 20 27 3.454 4.663
65 35 62 6.045 10.708
66 26 88 4.491 15.199
67 49 137 8.463 23.661
68 55 192 9.499 33.161
69 31 223 5.354 38.515
70 26 249 4.491 43.005
71 24 273 4.145 47.150
72 23 296 3.972 51.123
73 24 320 4.145 55.268
74 24 344 4.145 59.413
75 38 382 6.563 65.976
76 31 413 5.354 71.330
77 36 449 6.218 77.547
78 43 492 7.427 84.974
79 29 521 5.009 89.983
80 28 549 4.836 94.819
81 24 573 4.145 98.964























Frequency Distribution of the Acquiring Firms
Sample by Method of Payment and the
Announcement Year
Cash Securities Combination Total
Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
1 0.173 6 1.036 - - 7 1.209
1 1.209 12 2.072 1 0.173 20 3.454
9 1.554 24 4.145 2 0.345 35 6.045
4 0.691 21 3.626 1 0.173 26 4.491
9 1.554 40 6.908 - - 49 8.463
8 1.382 43 7.426 4 0.691 55 9.499
5 0.863 23 3.972 3 0.518 31 5.354
7 1.209 18 3.108 1 0.173 26 4.491
4 0.691 14 2.417 6 1.036 24 4.145
5 0.863 18 3.108 - - 23 3.972
7 1.209 16 2.763 1 0.173 24 4.145
14 2.417 9 1.554 1 0.173 24 4.145
16 2.763 18 3.108 4 0.691 38 6.563
15 2.590 15 2.590 1 0.173 31 5.354
17 2.936 15 2.590 4 0.691 36 6.218
23 3.972 11 1.899 9 1.554 43 7.427
20 3.454 5 0.863 4 0.691 29 5.009
21 3.626 4 0.691 3 0.518 28 4.836
10 1.727 9 1.554 5 0.863 24 4.145
4 0.691 2 0.345 - - 6 1.036
206 35.579 323 55.786 50 8.636 579 100.000
Cn-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table 4-8
Frequency Distribution of the Acquiring Firms Sample







Cash 206 206 35.579 35.579
Securities 323 529 55.786 91.364
Combination 50 579 8.636 100.00
Table 4-9
Frequency Distribution of the Acquiring Firms Sample






























Method of Analysis of the Stock Data
In order to estimate the abnormal returns associated with acquiring 
and acquired firms, the market model was used. This model assumes that 




R. = a . + B . R + e .  „ (4-1)i,t i i mt i,t
R. = the rate of return on security (i) over the period (t),
which is one day
R = the rate of return on the equal weighted market index; m, t
a i the intercept of t£e linear Relationship for security (i) and is given by E(R.) - $ E(R );m
B . = the slope of the linear relationship between security (i)i and the return on the market index, and is given by
Cov*it- V
V a r ( K )mt
e. = the unsystematic component of security i's returns at day
1* t, which is assumed to be N ^ (i,i,d) or normally,
independent and identically distributed with mean equal 
to zero and variance equal to a (e).
The error term, e. can be considered as a measure of the abnormali, t
returns of security (i) since it represents the deviation of security 
i's return from its expected return, given the return on the market 
portfolio. The estimated expected return for security (i) at time t 
given the realized market return is given by the following equation
R,*. = a • +  ̂ (4-2)it i i mt
A A
where a and B are estimates of a. and B.. These estimates are obtainedi l
using 100 daily returns from day t 220 to 11 121" t:̂ me horizon
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of the announcement period includes the period from t_2g to t+20 arounc* 
the announcement day (t^).
The excess returns for each security i at time t is given by the 
following equation
EEit * Eit ' “ i - B A t  (4'3)
where
ER .̂  = the excess return for security i at time t. it
R. = the realized return on security i at time t. it
A A
a., 6. = estimates of a. and 3. from the market model,i i i l
R = the returns on the equal weighted market index,mt
The market model applied to all firms in the sample and the excess
return (ER^t) are calculated for each day relative to the announcement
day. The average excess return for the portfolio of N firms is given by
  I N
ER = N I ER.t (4-4)
c i-i “
where
t = -20, ..., + 20
N = the number of securities included in the portfolio for
each day t.
The cumulative excess return around the event date is the sum of the 
average excess returns and is given by the following equation
t=+20 __
CER = 1 ER (4-5)
t=-20
where
t = -20, -19, ..., -1, 0, +1, ..., +19, +20
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To test if the average excess returns are significantly different 
from zero, a t-statistic was used. The test statistic is the ratio of 
the mean excess return to its standard deviation on any event day, which 




Standard deviations were estimated from the time series of the mean 
excess returns from t to day c 20’ an(̂  8iven by the following
equation
t=-20 _  —  ,
Z (ER - ER)2)*
t=-120
STD(ER ) = ------------------------- (4-7)
C (N - 1)
where
—  1 t=-20 __
ER = - E ER (4-8)
N t=-120
The test statistic is distributed as a student-t distribution, and is 
valid under the assumption that the mean excess returns are normally 
distributed, independent and stationary over time.
Bond Data Description
The second part of this study is concerned with returns to bond­
holders of the merging firms around merger announcements. Hence, we 
need two bond samples— one for the acquiring and the other for acquired
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firms. To construct the bond samples, the following procedures were 
followed.
Obtaining bond issues. From the sample of firms that have returns 
available on the CRSP tape, we determined if the firm had straight bond 
issues before the announcement date. We considered only straight debt; 
convertible bonds were excluded, this due to the fact that the behavior 
of convertible bond prices is more or less explained by the behavior of 
common stock prices. Because the only practical source of daily bond 
prices is the Wall Street Journal, bond issues had to be listed in the 
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) or the American Stock Exchange (ASE) for 
their prices to be available. Barron1s (1962-1971) and Moody’s Bond 
Record (1972-1982) were used to identify firms whose debt issues are 
listed on NYSE or ASE.
Collecting bond prices. Daily bond prices were collected from the 
Wall Street Journal. Prices were gathered for periods from 30 days 
before to 10 days after each merger announcement. Bond issues which had 
at least three trading prices available, including the announcement day, 
during the 41-day period were considered eligible to enter the sample. 
This is because two prices required to calculate each return and two 
returns are needed; one during the estimation period and the other in 
the announcement. Bond issues which had less than three trading prices 
available during the 41 days were excluded. This exclusion was made 
because two prices are needed to calculate one holding period return.
In the final analysis we were left with 64 bonds for the bidding 
firms and 29 bonds for the target firms. Table 4-10 and 4-11 show the
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Table 4-10
The Frequency Distribution of the Bond Sample for the






63 0 0 0.00
64 6 6 9.375 17.188
65 5 11 7.813 17.188
66 2 13 3.125 20.313
67 3 16 4.688 25.001
68 3 19 4.688 29.689
69 4 23 6.250 35.939
70 3 26 4.688 40.627
71 2 38 3.125 43.752
72 2 30 3.125 46.877
73 2 32 3.125 50.002
74 3 35 4.688 54.690
75 1 36 1.563 56.253
76 9 45 14.063 70.316
77 3 48 4.688 75.004
78 1 49 1.563 76.567
79 5 54 7.813 84.380
80 3 57 4.688 89.968
81 3 60 4.688 93.756
82 4 64 6.250 100.00
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Table 4-11
The Frequency Distribution of the Bond Sample for the






63 0 0 0.00 0.00
64 0 0 0.00 0.00
65 1 1 3.448 3.448
66 0 1 0.00 3.448
67 3 4 10.344 13.797
68 2 6 6.896 20.688
69 0 6 0.00 20.688
70 1 7 3.488 24.136
71 0 7 0.00 24.136
72 1 8 3.448 27.584
73 1 9 3.448 21.032
74 1 10 3.448 34.480
75 0 10 0.00 34.480
76 1 11 3.448 37.928
77 4 15 13.793 51.721
78 8 23 27.586 79.307
79 1 24 3.448 82.755
80 2 26 6.896 89.651
81 3 29 10.344 100.00
82 0 29 0.00 100.00
66
distribution of the acquired and acquiring firms bonds, respectively. 
Appendix A includes a listing of the sample by company, announcement 
date and whether the bidders or the targets has bond outstanding.
Thus, we can summarize the restrictions on the bond sample by the 
following points:
1. Both the acquiring and the acquired firms engage in a complete 
merger between June 30, 1962 and December 31, 1982.
2. The merging firms have publicly traded nonconvertible bonds 
outstanding at least 30 days before the announcement day.
3. Nonconvertible bonds must be among those listed on NYSE or ASE
for their prices to be available.
4. Each bond must have at least one price available on the
announcement day, before and after the announcement day, and
during the estimation period in order to calculate the return.
The Calculation of Bond Returns
Since the holding period returns were utilized in this study, the 
following formula was used to calculate bond returns:
R (4-9)i»t
where
R.i,t the holding period daily rate of return on bond (i) at time (t)
P. = the market price of bond (i) at day (t) i 919
P - = the market price of bond (i) at day (t-1)
1 j L“ X9
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C = the annual coupon payment per bond
C/360 = the coupon earned from holding the bond one day
D = the number of days accrued toward the next coupon payment
at the end of day (t)
Since the quoted bond price does not include the interest accruals, the
daily bond returns were adjusted for daily interest accruals. The dates
of interest payments were obtained from Moody’s Bond Record.
Method of Analysis of the Bond Data
The Mean Adjusted Return (MAR) model was utilized in this study to 
generate the abnormal performance around the merger announcement day. 
The methodology, which is described by Masulis (1980) and Brown and
Warner (1980), and used by Masulis (1980), Dann (1981) and Handjinicolaou 
and Kalay (1984), and is based on the following assumptions:
1. The process generating bond return is stationary
2. The time series return distribution is representative of the
bond returns distribution.
The advantage of using this procedure can be summarized by the 
following points:
1. To avoid the problems and the complexities associated with
other models, i.e., the market model and the determination of 
the market index. Also to avoid the specification and estima­
tion problems associated with determining the relationship 
between the bond returns and the return on the market index.
2. The Mean Adjusted Return Model does not depend on the assump­
tions of other models, i.e., the Capital Asset Pricing Model, 
being true.
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3. Brown and Warner (1980) found that the Mean Adjusted Model 
(MAR) is at least as powerful, if not more powerful, than 
other alternative market approaches.
The Mean Adjusted Return model states that
The expected return, E(R. I must be estimated from a time seriesi,t
of the bond returns over a representative period which does not include 
the event period, and is called the comparison period. In order to
generate abnormal performance measure and to test for the significance
of our hypotheses using this model, we followed the following steps:
Defining the announcement period and the estimation period. We
defined the announcement date as the day when the first public announce­
ment about the merger is mentioned in the Wall Street Journal. The 
return over event day t=0 and t=-l is used to examine the impact of 
merger announcement. This is done because news reaches the market via 
the Wall Street Journal before the close of trading on the trading day 
prior to the publication date. Thus the effect of some merger announce­
ment will occur on day t=-l.
We followed the following steps for the bond return:
1. We defined the event period to run from 10 days before to 10
(4-10)
where
R. = the return on bond (i) at day (t) i * t9
E(R ) = the expected return on bond (i) at day (t) i, t9
e = the random disturbance with E(e ) = 01 f t 1 ) t
days after the announcement day (-10, -9 1, 0, +1,
+9, +10). The time horizon was not increased to a longer
period because of the difficulty associated with collecting 
bond prices and the belief that 20 days around the announce­
ment day is enough to capture the impact of merger announce­
ment .
The estimation period runs from day -30 to day -11 a total of 
20 days which were used to estimate the mean and the variance 
of the excess returns.
Portfolio formulation. A portfolio of bond returns was 
formulated for each day from t to
daily returns is the arithmetic average of bond returns. 
Bonds for which returns were not available at any particular 
day were excluded from the portfolio mean returns of that 
particular date. Hence, the number of bonds in the portfolios 
will be allowed to vary from one day to another. The arith­
metic mean formula, used to calculate mean return for each 
day, is
I N  (4-11)
R = N Z i,t 
i=l
where t = -30, ..., -1, 0, +1, ..., +10 and N is the number 
of good returns in a portfolio on a given day t. R. is the 
bond daily returns for day t (the holding period returns from 
holding a bond from a trading date to another). The compari­
son period mean return is formed from the daily mean returns. 
That is, the comparison period mean return is the average of 
the time series of daily mean returns for the period from day
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t_^Q to day t_n» a total of 20 days. The formula used to 
calculate the comparison period mean returns is:
1 -11
R = —  Z R (4-12)
20 -30
The excess return is defined as the difference between the 
daily portfolio return for each event date, from day t to 
day t+ ^Q, and the comparison period return. It is given by
ERt = Rt - R (4-13)
where ER^ is the average excess return for each event date, 
and t = -10, ..., -1, 0, +1, ..., +10.
Test of significance. To know if the announcement period 
excess returns are significantly different from the comparison 
period mean excess return, a significance test is needed. In 
other words, to accept or reject the null hypotheses that 
there is no difference between an announcement period excess 
return and the corresponding comparison period mean excess 
return, a significance test is required. A student t-distri- 




where ERfc = the average excess return for each event date 
(-10, ..., -1, 0, +1, ...» +10); STd^g^  ̂ = the estimated 
standard deviation of the excess return and it is estimated 
over the period of day t to day t using the following
equation:
71
t=-ll   ,
STD(ER ) = [ £ (ER - ER)/19F (4-15)
t=-30
—  1 t - 1 1
ER = 20 Z ERtt=-30
The cumulative excess return is calculated over the period 
from day to day t+^Q using the following equation
T
CER,^ = I ER (4-16)
t=-10
To test for the significance of the cumulative excess return, 
the following test statistic was used
CER™
t = ------------------------------ (4—3.7)
STD(CER)
A
where S T D ^ ^ ^  is the estimated standard deviation of the 
cumulative excess returns and is given by
S™(CER> * S™ ( E R t) ' ” (4-18)
and n is the number of days in the event period. The test 
statistic is distributed as a student t-distribution and it is 
valid under the assumption that the mean excess returns are 
normally distributed, independent and stationary over time.
The Cross Sectional Methodology
The arguments advanced in Chapter two explain the impact of merger 
announcements on the securityholders of the merging firms through a set 
of firm specific characteristics. In this section, we develop an
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expectation model to examine the abnormal returns cross-sectionally and 
to test the hypotheses advanced in Chapter two.
We assume that the gain from merger announcements for firm i is a 
linear function of k characteristics of the firm. Formally, we hypothe­
size that the excess return for firm i is given by the following linear 
equation
m i ■ A  ek «ik «-i9>k=l
where
ER^ = the excess return to securityholders of firm i
(3̂  = the coefficient of the k*"*1 characteristic
M., = the k*"*1 characteristic of firm iik
Since the change in the market value of the firm around merger 
announcement is observable, we can estimate via regression of the 
following form
EEi - 60 + eiMil + 62M i2 + • • • + 6kMik + ei <4~20>
where
B's = the parameter of the regression model
= represents the error component of the 204 firms in which
we have good returns available for both acquiring and 
acquired firms. Complete data on the firms’ 
characteristics were provided in 204 instances.
Description of Regression Variables
After we estimated the excess return around merger announcements 
through the event study, we then attempted to identify the sources of 
the gain based on the theories presented in Chapter two.
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In order to capture the full impact of merger announcements, we
selected to use a form of cumulative average residuals for each
announcement and use it as dependent variable in the cross sectional 
equation. The following definition of the excess returns was used as 
dependent variables for the securityholders of the merging firms:
RETT = The cumulative excess returns of 20 days before including
the announcement day for the target firm stockholders.
RETT1 = The cumulative excess returns of day (-1) and day zero 
for the target firms stockholders.
RETB = The cumulative excess returns of 20 days before including 
the announcement day for the bidding firms stockholders. 
RETB1 = The cumulative excess returns of day (-1) and day zero 
for the bidding firms stockholders.
RBT = Returns to target bondholders calculated as the change in 
the announcement price (Pq) and the price 10 days before
the announcement (P ^q ) and it is defined as
RBT=(P0-P_10)/P-10)
RBT1 = The cumulative excess returns of day (-1) and day zero to
target bondholders.
RBB = Returns for the bidders bondholders calculated as
RBB=(p0-P_io^ P-10‘
RBB1 = The cumulative excess returns of day (-1) and day zero to
bidding firms bondholders.
As we notice, the dependent variable is defined in two different
ways. The cumulative excess returns from day -20 to day zero is
included to capture the effect of any significant excess returns before
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the announcement day which may be due to leakage of information, the sum 
of the excess returns of day (-1) and day zero is included because the 
highest excess returns occurs during these two days.
The independent variables which entered the cross-sectional equa­
tion consist of the following:
1. Relative price-earnings ratio (RPER). In order to examine 
price-earning ratio hypotheses, we used the relative price-earning 
ratios (RPER) which is the price-earning ratios of the acquired firm 
divided by the price earning ratio of the acquiring firm. Formally, it 
is
rpfr = (PER) of the target 
(PER) of the bidder
The price-earning ratio is defined as the closing price divided by 
earning per share which exclude extra ordinary items and discontinued 
operations, and it is obtained from the last year before the announce­
ment date. The price earning ratio hypotheses implies that acquiring 
firms acquired firms with lower price earning ratios than its own. The 
market will then evaluate the combined earnings of the two firms at the 
higher price earning ratio of the acquiring firm. The increase in 
earning per share from PER differences will tend to raise the stock­
holders assessments of the future earnings, and this will lead to an 
increase in the market value of both firms. Thus, we expect to find the 
sign of RPER is positively related with the excess return to security­
holders of both firms.
Both the Industrial Compustat tape and Standard and Poor Stock 
Reports are used to generate the price-earning ratios from one year 
before the announcement year for both acquiring and acquired firms.
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2. Relative Tobin’s Q-ratio (RTQR); The relative Q-ratio, or the 
valuation ratio, is included as a proxy for the possibility that 
acquired firms are undervalued. The RTQR is defined as
RTOR-^mar^et va-̂ue equity/book value of equity) to the target).. ...
(market value of equity/book value of equity) to the bidder)
The market value is the number of shares outstanding multiplied by the
price per share, and the book value is book value per share multiplied
by the number of shares outstanding for the year before the announcement
year. We expect this ratio to be positively related with the excess
returns of both firms.
3. Relative Debt-Equity ratio (RPER) : The RDER is included to
examine the leverage effect hypotheses and to capture the potential of
the target firm to add to the debt capacity of the acquiring firm
because of the underutilization of the target debt. The leverage ratio
is defined as the book value of the long term debt divided by the market
value of equity. Formally, it is
PEP _ total book value of long term debt 22)
total market value of equity
and the relative leverage ratio (RLR) is given as
EDER - ?g* g *  E (4-23)DER of the bidder
Long term debt was obtained from the Industrial Compustat tape and from 
Standard and Poor's Stock Report for the year before the announcement 
year.
4. Relative size (RSIZE). To examine the managerialism hypothe­
ses, which implies that managers are motivated to increase the size of 
their firms because the compensation to managers is a function of the
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size of the firm, and thus they adopt a lower investment hurdle rate, we 
Included the relative size which is defined as
T = total market value of equity to target ,, ...
total market value of equity to bidders
We expect to find the relative size is negatively related with excess
returns to the bidding firm and positively related with the target
excess returns. The market value of equity for both target and bidder
firms is defined as the closing market price multiplied by the number of
shares outstanding one year before the announcement year, and it is
obtained from the Industrial Compustat tape.
5. Relative variance (RVAR). The relative variance was included 
to examine the hypotheses that variance effect could reflect the manage­
ment’s action to maximize the value of its firms by acquiring targets
with lower variance to reduce the variability of their firms. The 
relative variance is given by
variance of the target returnsRVAR = --- ------- 7— — — rj’jj------1----  (4-25)variance of the bidder returns
6. Method of payment (MPAY). To capture the effect of different 
methods of payment, we included a dummy variable to distinguish between 
cash versus security mergers. The variable takes the value of one for 
cash and zero otherwise.
7. Merger type (MTYPE). To examine the argument whether merger 
produces financial or real synergies, we included a dummy variable to 
examine the difference between conglomerate versus nonconglomerate and 
another variable to account for nonconglomerate versus pure conglomerate 
mergers.
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8. Regulation (REGU). To account for the regulation effect over
time, we included one dummy variable which takes the value of one for
the period before July 1968 and zero after. The main two regulations
which we considered were the Williams Amendments of July 1968 and the
Tax Reform Act of December 1969. The period after July 1968 can be
described as a regulatory period.
Based on this discussion, we set out to estimate the parameters of
the following equation:
CER. = B_ + B..RPER. + B-RTQR. + B„RDER. (4-26)i 0 1 i 2 ^ i 3 i
+ B.RSIZE. + B CRVAR. + B-MPAY.4 l 5 i 6 i
+ B-jMTYPE. + B_REGU. + e.7 i 8 i i
The predicted sign of each coefficient are summarized in Table 2-2.
CHAPTER 5
RESULTS
The objective of this study is to examine the returns to stock­
holders and bondholders of both acquiring and acquired firms around the 
merger announcement day and to examine the factors which may explain the 
returns to each group.
This chapter is divided into three sections, the first includes the 
results from the overall sample of stockholders of acquiring and 
acquired firms. The second section presents the results of the bond 
samples of acquiring and acquired firms, and the last section contains 
the results of a cross-sectional model for each group of security­
holders .
Returns to Acquired Firms Stockholders
The average excess returns (AER), t-statistics, the cumulative 
average excess returns (CAER), and the percent positive to the acquired 
firm stockholders are presented in Table 5-1. Figures 5-la and 5-lb 
display graphically the cumulative and average excess returns for the 
twenty days prior to and twenty days after the first public announcement 
of merger.
The main result is the large positive excess returns earned by the 
stockholders of the acquired firms on the day of the merger announce­




Market Model Residuals over the Period T_2q through T+2U 












-20 0.008 0.008 0.662 0.448
-15 -0.054 1.354 -0.420 0.476
-10 0.281 2.971 1.674** 0.506
- 9 0.411 3.383 2.308* 0.498
- 8 0.842 4.226 3.937* 0.540
- 7 0.815 5.041 3.549*\ 0.529
- 6 0.438 5.480 3.609* 0.512
- 5 0.540 6.020 3.210* 0.523
- 4 1.584 7.604 6.206* 0.628
- 3 0.965 8.560 5.506* 0.573
- 2 1.892 10.462 8.516* 0.634
- 1 4.310 14.773 8.895* 0.692
0 4.818 19.591 7.467* 0.664
1 0.360 19.951 1.757** 0.473
2 0.157 20.109 1.065 0.476
3 0.080 20.190 0.646 0.493
4 0.051 20.241 0.435 0.459
5 -0.086 20.155 -0.665 0.459
6 0.265 20.420 2.421* 0.526
7 0.181 20.601 1.732** 0.515
8 0.234 20.835 1.891** 0.515
9 0.046 20.882 0.400 0.479
10 -0.271 20.611 -1.898** 0.454
15 -0.005 20.541 -0.051 0.440
20 -0.056 20.523 -0.421 0.457
* Significant at 0.01 level.
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Figure 5-1A. Average Excess Returns to Target Firm Stockholders
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Figure 5-1B. Cumulative Average Excess Returns to Target Stockholders 
20 Days before thru 20 Days after Merger Announcement CO f— *
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is 4.82 percent with a t-statistic of 7.47. On day t the average 
excess return is 4.31 percent with a t-statistic of 8.89, which is 
statistically significant at the 0.01 level. The cumulative excess 
return from t through the merger announcement day, t^, is 19.59 
percent.
These findings are consistent with previous empirical results. 
Dodd (1980) reported a cumulative excess return of 21.78 percent for 
twenty days before and through the day of the first public announcement. 
Asquith, Bruner and Mullins (1983) reported a 20.5 percent CAER, while 
Asquith (1983) reported 13.3 percent for the same period. Jensen and 
Ruback (1983) reported a 15.9 percent average CAER from five studies 
investigating the returns to acquired firms stockholders.
In addition to the large positive excess returns at the announce­
ment day and the day before, a rise is also shown in the period 
immediately prior to the announcement date (Figures 5-la and 5-lb). 
Table 5-1 documents this movement in which the excess returns are 
positive and statistically significant from day t to t^. These 
results indicate that the largest excess returns occur on the announce­
ment day, but there is still some positive excess return during the 10 
days before the announcement day. This pattern of abnormal returns can 
be explained by the leakage of information about the merger before it 
appears in the Wall Street Journal (Keown and Pinkerton (1981)), but 
still the excess returns on day t^ and t ^ dominate all other daily 
returns. This indicates that most of the new information becomes 
available on these days.
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Table 5-2 presents a comparison of the mean cumulative excess 
returns over the twenty-one days from t 2q to across all merger 
types. The t-statistic represents a test of the null hypotheses that 
the difference between two means is different from zero and it is given
    1 1
t = [CER. _ CERJ/S ✓ - + - (5-1)1 2 p m n
= the mean of the cumulative excess returns for group one 
(non-conglomerate);
= the mean of the cumulative excess returns for group two 
(conglomerate);
= the number of firms in group one and two, respectively;
= (m-l)S2 + (n-l)S^ / (m+n-2);
which is the pooled standard deviation where:
2 = estimated variance of group one;
2 = estimated variance of group two and t has (m+n-2) degrees 
of freedom.
Panel A in Table 5-2A shews that when all mergers are viewed 
together, the cumulative excess returns are virtually the same across 
merger type and the t-statistics between any two combinations are not 
significant. Panel B (Table 5-2A) also indicates that there is no 
difference across merger type when cash is used as the medium of 
exchange. As shown in panel C, there is a slight difference between 
conglomerate versus non-conglomerate when securities are used as a 
medium of exchange. The main indication is that there is no significant 
difference across merger type, which is consistent with the early 
conclusions of Wansley, Lane and Yang (1983), and it is in contrast to
where
CER1




Cumulative Excess Returns Comparison by Type of Merger 




t-Statistic for the Mean 
Difference
Fi rms of CER Non-Conglomerate A l 1-Conglomerate Pure Conglomerate
Panel A 
Merger Type:
Non-conglomerate 56 21.299 0.0 0.633 -0.098
All conglomerate 305 19.302 -0.633 0.0 -0.969




Merger Type - Cash
Non-conglomerate 18 24.497 0.0 -0.065 -0.197
All conglomerate 124 24.906 0.065 0.0 -0.316
Pure conglomerate 51 26.221 0.197 0.316 0.0
Panel C
Merger Type - Securities
Non-conglomerate 36 20.441 0.0 1.468 0.131
All conglomerate 147 15.221 -1.468 0.0 -1.277
Pure conglomerate 49 19.534 -0.131 1,277 0.0
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the conclusion of Elgers and Clark (1980) that conglomerate mergers 
benefit acquired stockholders more than does non-conglomerate mergers.
Table 5-2B shows that the cumulative excess returns comparison 
between different methods of payment. The mean CER for cash mergers is 
24.855 percent, while it is 16.248 percent for security mergers. The 
difference is significantly different from zero at the 0.01 level with a 
t-statistic of 2.3.
This result is consistent with earlier results of Wansley, Lane and 
Yang (1983), in which they found that cash mergers provide higher 
returns than security mergers for the stockholders of the acquired 
firms. This study attributes the difference between method of payment 
to accounting treatment and tax treatment of the merger.
In summary, this part of the study examined the excess returns to 
stockholders of the acquired firms around merger announcement day. The 
evidence indicates that acquired firms stockholders earn statistically 
significant positive excess returns twenty days before and through the 
announcement day of merger. While the evidence is consistent with the 
information effect hypotheses, we cannot draw this conclusion at this 
stage until we examine the return to bondholders of the acquired firms 
to see if this return came at the expense of other securityholders.
The evidence indicates that there is no significant difference 
between the CER across merger type. This may be due to the diversity of 
operation of the firms involved in merger which makes it difficult to 
classify each merger under one category or another. This, in turn,
Table 5-2B





of Mean t-Statisties of the Mean Difference
Fi rm CER Cash Securities Combination
Cash 142 24.855 0.0 2.299* 2.024*
Securities 183 16.248 -2.299* 0.0 0.062
Combination 36 16.036 -2.024* -0.062 0.0
* Significant at 0.01 level
00ON
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makes it difficult to determine if one class produces financial and/or 
operational synergies or not.
Differences in returns do exist between different methods of 
payment, where cash mergers provide higher and significant positive 
return than security merger to the stockholders of acquired firms. This 
difference was attributed, by previous studies, to tax and accounting 
treatment of merger.
Returns to Acquiring Firms Stockholders
Table 5-3 shows the average and cumulative excess returns twenty 
days before and twenty days after the announcement day for acquiring 
firms. Figures 5-2a and 5-2b graphically depict the cumulative and 
average excess returns, respectively. As indicated in Table 5-3, there 
is little market reaction on the announcement day, even though the 
two-day excess return, 0.31 percent, is significant at the 0.01 level. 
The t-statistic is 2.48 for the portfolio of two-days announcement. 
Over the entire 41-day period the stockholders of the acquiring firms 
gain 1.21 percent with a t-statistic of 2.3.
Table 5-4 shows the distribution of the cumulative excess returns 
over different intervals of time. The results which appear in this 
table are consistent with earlier work of Asquith, Bruner and Mullins 
(1983) in which they found the CAER to be 2.6% for twenty days before 
and twenty days after the announcement day. Malatesta (1983) reported a 
CAER of 0.90 percent, and Eckbo (1983) reported a 1.58 percent CAER 
twenty days before and through the announcement date. These results are
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Table 5-3
Market Model Residuals over the Period T_2o throtfght T+2q 
for 579 Acquiring Firms
Percentage Percentage
Day of Daily of Daily t-Stastic Percent AER
AER CAER of AER Positi ve
-20 0.060 0.060 0.699 0.483
-15 0.126 0.291 1.579 0.497
-10 0.128 0.267 1.425 0.516
- 9 0.113 0.380 1.338 0.483
- 8 0.025 0.406 0.321 0.469
- 7 0.108 0.514 1.893** 0.523
- 6 0.091 0.606 1.065 0.476
- 5 -0.126 0.479 -1.611 0.468
- 4 0.148 0.627 1.709** 0.509
- 3 -0.115 0.512 -1.458 0.443
- 2 -0.001 0.511 • -0.015 0.476
- 1 0.034 0.545 0.40b 0.476
0 0.272 0.817 3.348* 0.506
1 0.084 0.902 0.905 0.490
2 0.033 0.935 0.419 0.497
3 0.158 1.093 1.896** 0.509
4 0.185 1.278 2.233* 0.514
5 -0.018 - 1.260 -0.211 0.480
6 -0.030 1.230 -0.347 0.502
7 -0.019 1.211 -0.240 0.471
8 -0.118 1.092 -1.535 0.456
9 -0.019 1.073 -0.214 0.473
10 -0.020 1.053 -0.246 0.499
15 -0.081 1.138 -1.040 0.461
20 0.068 1.208 0.790 0.481
* Significant at 0.01 level.





















0 . 0 1 6
O . O ’ O-
t.00.
-o.cc:-
- 2 0  - i f  - 1 6 C 214 4 6 1210 14 16 16 2 C
TEAE j MG DAT AROUKT- AldNOUNCDCNT DAT
Figure 5-2A. Average Excess Returns to Bidding Firms Stockholders 
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Cumulative Average Excess Returns Over Different 
Intervals of Time 
for Acquiring Firms - Stockholders
Time Period CAER% t-Statistic
t-20 0.51 1.30
t+2 t0 t+20 0.27 0.71
t-20 t0 t+20 1.21 2.30*
T_^ to tQ 0.31 2.48*
t -l 0.03 0.41
t0 0.27 3.35*
* Significant at 0.01 level.
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in contrast with the findings of Dodd (1980), who reported a negative 
two-days excess return to the acquiring firms stockholders.
Table 5-5a presents a comparison of the mean cumulative excess 
returns across merger type. When all types of mergers are considered 
together, it appears that there is a difference between conglomerate and 
non-conglomerate mergers. Conglomerate mergers are shown to provide a 
higher return to stockholders of the acquiring firms than non­
conglomerate mergers, but the difference is not highly significant. 
When cash mergers are considered across merger type, the difference 
becomes larger and statistically significant at the 0.10 percent level. 
These results are consistent with the findings of Elgers and Clark 
(1980) who found that conglomerate mergers benefit the acquiring share­
holders more than non-conglomerate mergers.
In contrast with the results of Wansley, Lane and Yang (1983), the 
findings shown in Table 4-5b indicate that there is no significant 
difference in residuals between different methods of payment. Although 
the cash merger CAER is 1.1368 percent compared to 0.49% for security 
mergers, the difference is not significant.
In summary, the results reported in this section indicate that the 
acquiring firms stockholders gain a moderate abnormal return from 
merger. While this finding is consistent with the information effect 
hypothesis, we will postpone this conclusion until we examine the 
returns to bondholders of the acquiring firms because of the possibility 
of wealth transfer from bondholders to stockholders.
The results indicate that there is some difference between con­
glomerate versus non-conglomerate merger, in which conglomerate mergers
Table 5-5a
Cumulative Average Excess Returns Comparison by Type of Meryer 




t-Statistic for the Mean 
Di fference
Firms CAER % Non-Conglomerate All Conglomerate Pure Conglomerate
Meryer Type
Non-conglomerate 112 -0.09886 0.0 -1.132 1.227
All-conglomerate 476 1.11677 1.123 0.0 -0.204
Pure conglomerate 161 1.30917 -1.227 0.204 0.0
Merger Type - Cash
Non-clonglomerate 34 -1.3475 0.0 1.634 -1.156
All-conglomerate 172 1.6278 1.634 0.0 0.620
Pure conglomerate 68 0.7594 1.156 -0.620 0.0
Merger Type - Securities
Non-conglomerate 71 0.3546 0.0 -0.125 -0.734
Ail conglomerate 252 0.5266 0.125 0.0 -0.809
Pure conglomerate 77 1.6131 0.734 0.809 0.0
VOco
Table 5-5b
Cumulative Average Excess Returns Comparison by Method of Payment 
for the Acquiring Firms Stockholders
Number
Method of of Mean of t-Statistic of the Mean Difference
Payment F i rms CAER % Cash Securities Combination
Cash 206 1.1368 0.0 0.979 -0.753
Securities 323 0.4888 -0.979 0.0 -1.184
Combi nati on 50 2.3682 0.753 1.184 0.0
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provide higher returns than non-conglomerate mergers, a result which is 
consistent with the diversification and debt capacity rationale of the 
conglomerate merger.
The results also indicate that cash mergers provide slightly higher 
returns to acquiring stockholders than security mergers, though the 
difference is not significant.
Returns to Acquired Firms Bondholders
To evaluate the bond market's total response to a merger announce­
ment, the average excess returns for each event were generated using the 
mean adjusted returns model, for a total sample of 64 bonds to acquiring 
firms and 29 bonds to acquired firms.
Table 5-6 gives the average and cumulative average excess returns 
and the t-statistics for 29 bonds issued by the acquired firms over the 
period of 10 days before until 10 days after the merger announcement.
As seen in column 2, the number of bonds for each event day vary from
day to day. This is because many bonds are not traded frequently, so 
the numbers reflect the number of bonds which have prices available for 
that day. The table shown that there are 12 days with negative returns 
versus 9 days of positive returns. Even though there are some days with 
large and significant positive returns, the largest negative returns 
occur on day zero where the average excess return is -0.66 percent, with 
a t-statistic of -2.364, which is statistically significant at the 0.01 
level. The cumulative average excess return for day t  ̂ and day t^ is 
-0.701 percent with t-statistic of -1.778. Figure 5-3a represents a 
graphic translation of the average excess returns.
Table 5-6
Average and Cumulative Average Excess Returns and 















-10 18 -0.23728 -0.850 -0.23728 -0.850
- 9 16 0.59132 2.120* 0.35403 0.897
- 8 15 -0.12825 -0.459 0.22578 0.467
- 7 18 -0.43862 -1.572 -0.21284 -0.381
- 6 16 -0.07299 -0.261 -0.28583 -0.458
- 5 18 0.14560 0.522 -0.14023 -0.206
- 4 18 0.28055 1.005 0.14032 0.190
- 3 22 -0.08907 -0.319 0.05125 0.064
- 2 16 -0.26049 -0.934 -0.20924 -0.250
- 1 17 -0.04188 -0.150 -0.25113 -0.284
0 29 -0.65950 -2.364* -0.91062 -0.984
1 18 0.12099 0.433 -0.89963 -0.817
2 18 -0.04995 -0.179 -0.83958 -0.834
3 18 0.44716 1.603 -0.39242 -0.376
4 22 -0.13380 -0.479 -0.52633 -0.487
5 19 0.08999 0.322 -0.43624 -0.391
6 15 0.26855 0.962 -0.16769 -0.146
7 16 0.29201 1.047 0.12432 0.106
8 19 -0.38070 -0.365 -0.25638 -0.210
9 21 -0.35936 -1.288 -0.61574 -0.493
10 18 0.49394 1.767** -0.12280 -0.09b
Comparison period mean adjusted return = 0.05912. Standard deviation of averaye excess return = 0.27889.
* Significant at 0.01 level.
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Figure 5-3B. Cumulative Average Excess Returns to Target Firms Bondholders 
10 Days Before thru 10 Days After Merger Announcement vo
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Column 5 (Table 5-6) and Figure 5-3b show the cumulative average 
excess returns over the period of 10 days before until 10 days after the 
merger announcement. The t-statistics are given in column 6. The 
cumulative average excess returns are negative but not statistically 
significant. None of the t-statistics are significant at any day, 
suggesting that the bondholders of the target firms do not gain from 
merger and the negative returns they have are not statistically 
significant.
These results are consistent with previous findings of Asquith and 
Kim (1982), in which they reported that the sum of returns from day t  ̂
and day t^ are -0.110 percent to acquired bondholders with a t-statis- 
tics of -0.59. The results of this study show a -0.701 percent average 
excess return with a t-statistic of -1.778 over the same period.
Although Asquith and Kim (1982) do not provide an explanation about 
the negative returns to acquired bondholders, it is a point that needs 
more investigation. The negative returns to acquired bondholders may be 
explained by the fact that when the target is acquired, the bondholders 
lose the assets which serve as collateral to secure their debt. This is 
because the bondholders, whether they are secured or unsecured, have a 
priority in the event of default only to assets owned by the target, and 
when the acquiring firm considers the payment to the bondholders of the 
target, they consider the present value of the amount to be paid in the 
future. If the bonds have been issued at an interest rate that is 
substantially below the present effective rate for a similar security, 
then the price will decrease and the returns will be negative to the 
target bondholders. This is because the bidder uses the present
100
effective interest rate to discount the future payment to target 
bondholders, not the interest rate at the time when the bonds are
issued.
Returns to Acquiring Firms Bondholders
The average and the cumulative average excess returns for the
bondholders of the acquiring firms over the period from 10 days before 
merger announcement until 10 days after are presented in Table 5-7 and 
Figures 5-4a and 5-4b. Average excess returns were almost equally split 
between positive and negative observations with 11 positive and 10
negative. Comparison of the before and after merger periods shows 6
positive and 4 negative after the merger. The largest positive excess 
return, 0.689 percent with a t-statistic of 4.65, which is statistically 
significant at the 0.01 level occurred at day t The sum of the t_^ 
and tg excess return shows an average excess return of 0.859 percent 
with a t-statistic of 4.095, which is statistically significant at the 
0.01 level.
Figures 5-4a and 5-4b depict the average and the cumulative average 
excess returns over a 21-day period. The cumulative average excess 
returns are positive. This shows that the bondholders of the acquiring 
firms earn 1.912 percent over 21 days before and after the merger 
announcement with a t-statistic of 2.812, which is significant at the 
0.01 level.
The findings of this study indicate that the bondholders of the 
acquiring firms are in fact affected by merger announcements, and they 
gain a significant positive excess return. These findings are also
Table 5-7
Average and Cumulative Average Excess Returns and 















-10 39 -0.170 -1.147 -0.170 -1.147
- 9 41 0.059 0.400 -0.110 -0.528
- 8 39 0.182 1.228 0.071 0.278
- 7 39 0.091 0.614 0.162 0.547
- 6 39 -0.174 -1.179 -0.012 -0.037
- 5 41 -0.008 -0.060 -0.021 -0.058
- 4 33 0.397 2.680* 0.376 0.958
- 3 36 -0.203 -1.372 0.172 0.411
- 2 34 0.543 3.664* 0.716 1.609
- 1 50 0.689 4.650* 1.405 2.997*
0 64 0.168 1.138 1.574 3.201*
1 36 0.351 2.369* 1.926 3.748*
2 38 -0.105 -0.707 1.821 3.405*
3 36 -0.045 -0.305 1.775 3.199*
4 38 -0.055 -0.373 1.720 2.994*
5 34 0.189 1.274 1.090 3.218*6 35 -0.138 -0.935 1.770 2.895*
7 40 -0.221 -1.491 1.549 2.462*
8 33 0.140 0.944 1.689 2.613*
9 41 0.233 1.574 1.923 2.899*
10 35 -0.011 -0.075 1.911 2.812*
Comparison period mean adjusted return = 0.02758. 
* Significant at 0.01 level.
Standard deviation of average excess return = 0.14833.
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consistent with results of Settle, Petry and Hsia (1984) in which they 
found a 4 percent abnormal return during the merger announcement month. 
Asquith and Kim (1982) reported a 0.235 percent return over day t ^ and 
day tg with a t-statistic of 0.61, which is not statistically signifi­
cant, while the results of this study show a 0.859 percent abnormal 
return over day t  ̂ and day t^ with t-statistic of 4.095.
Information Versus Wealth Transfer Effect
One of the objectives of this study was to examine the information 
effect versus wealth transfer effect between the stockholders and the 
bondholders of the merging firms around merger announcement to determine 
if the gain to the stockholders of the merging firms comes at the 
expense of other securityholders, namely the bondholders, and to find 
out whether the bondholders gain from merger.
Table 5-8 provides a comparison between the cumulative excess 
returns to stockholders of the acquiring and acquired firms and the 
bondholders of acquiring and acquired firms over different intervals of 
time, along with their associated t-statistics. For the acquiring firms 
securityholders, the table shows that both the stockholders and the 
bondholders gain significant positive excess returns. Over day t  ̂ and 
tp, the average excess return is 0.306 and 0.859 percent with 
t-statistics of 2.48 and 4.095, respectively. For the period of 10 days 
before the merger until day t both the stockholders and the bond­
holders of the acquiring firms have positive excess returns of 0.372 and
0.720 percent respectively, but they are not statistically
Table 5-8
Cumulative Average Excess Returns Comparison to the Securityholders of the Merging Firms 
Over Different Intervals of Time and the Associated t-Statistics








t _ i o  t 0  t - 2 0.372 0.72 7.772 -0.209(1.494) (1.61) (10.794)* (0.250)
t + 2  t0 t+10 0.151 -0.014 0.659 0.667(0.606) (-0.032) (0.915) (0.797)
















M 0.03 0.690 4.311 -0.042(0.41) (4.650)* (14.773)* (-0.150)
to 0.27 0.169 4.818 -0.660(3.35)* (1.138) (19.591)* (02.364)*
♦Statistically significant at 0.01 level.
** Statistically significant at 0.05 level. 105
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significant. Over the period of 2 days before the merger announcement 
until 10 days after, the returns are also not significant.
These findings are consistent with the information effect hypothe­
ses, wherein both the stockholders and the bondholders of the acquiring 
firms are affected positively due to their expectation of future gain 
from merger. There is no evidence that there is a wealth transfer from 
the stockholders to the bondholders due to the diversification effect or 
from the bondholders to stockholders to the incentive effect.
Table 5-8 shows that the stockholders of the target firms gain a 
highly significant abnormal return (9.129 percent with t-statistic of 
26.897) over day t ^ and day t^, while the two days excess return to the 
bondholders of the target firm is -0.701 percent, with t-statistic of 
-1.778. Over the period from 10 days before the merger announcement 
until 2 days before, the stockholders of the target firm gain 7.772 
percent, with a t-statistic of 10.794, while the bondholder's CAER is 
-0.209 percent with a t-statistic of -0.250, which is not significant.
For the period from 2 days after to 10 days after the merger 
announcement, both the stockholders and the bondholders have positive 
abnormal returns, but they are not statistically significant. The 
negative returns to target bondholders for the period prior to the 
merger announcement, though not highly significant, is attributed to the 
fact that the payment to the bondholders of the target is the present 
value of the future payment discounted at the effective interest rate, 
which is higher than the rate when the bonds are issued. These findings 
indicate that the stockholders of the target firm gain highly signifi­
cant abnormal returns, which is consistent with the informational effect
Table 5-9
Spearman Correlation Coefficients Between the Average Excess Returns to Securityholders
of the Merging Firms from Day t_^Q to t+ ^Q*








Acquiring Bondholders 1.0000 0.1234 -0.1857 0.3247
(0.0000) (0.5942) (0.4203) (0.1510)










Acquired Stockholders — --
(0.0000)
1.000 0
* Significance level are in parentheses.
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hypotheses, while the bondholders generate negative, but not statis­
tically significant, abnormal returns.
Table 5-9 reports the Spearman correlation coefficients between the 
average excess returns to the securityholders of the merging firms over 
the period t to t^^. The correlation coefficient between the average 
abnormal returns for the acquiring bondholders and acquiring 
stockholders is positive (0.1234). It is also positive between 
acquiring and acquired stockholders (0.1935), which indicates that the 
returns move into a positive direction, even though the coefficients are 
not statistically significant. The only group that has a negative 
correlation with the other groups is the bondholders of the target firm.
A summary of the results of this section indicate that both the 
stockholders and the bondholders of the acquiring firms gain signifi­
cantly positive excess returns due to the merger announcement, a finding 
which is consistent with the information effect hypotheses. the 
stockholders of the acquired firms gain highly significant excess 
returns, also consistent with the information effect hypotheses, while 
the bondholders of the acquired firms generate negative, but not statis­
tically significant, excess returns. No evidence was found to support 
the wealth transfer hypotheses, either from the stockholders to the 
bondholders or vice versa.
Table 5-10
Mean of Dependent and Independent Variables for the 




-1,0 Size VAR PER DER TQR
Target Variables 21.686 10.600 147.598* 0.0336 11.455 0.534 1.404
Bidders Vi rabies 0.587 0.554 989.060* 0.023 12.956 0.622 2.129
Relative Variables** — — 0.345 1.570 1.077 1.140 0.893
* Millions of dollars
**Each relative variables is the ratio of the target to the bidder variable.
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Results of the Cross-sectional Models
One Important issue we investigate is the determinants of merger 
gains as explained by different hypotheses. This is done by first 
constructing a portfolio comparison of the cumulative excess returns 
from t_2Q to for each variable. This is done by dividing the sample 
of 204 observations (firms) for which information is available on both 
bidders and targets into five portfolios (from the lowest to the 
highest) according to the relative variable, while for the pinary 
variables the comparison of the CER is accomplished by the comparison of 
cash versus security, conglomerate versus non-conglomerate and pure 
conglomerate, and the period before 1968 versus the period after 1963. 
Second, we use the linear model where the dependent variable is defined 
in two ways: 1) the cumulative excess return from day t £q £o tg* an(l
2) the cumulative excess returns from day -1 to day zero. The regres­
sion procedure is employed for both the stockholders and the bondholders 
of the merging firms.
This section is divided into four parts. Each part reports the 
results of the portfolio comparison procedure and the two linear models 
that explain the returns (using two definitions) to stockholders of the 
target, stockholders of the bidder, bondholders of the target and 
bondholders of the bidding firms, respectively.
1. Target Stockholders:
Table 5-10 presents summary information on the discrete independent 
variables of the models. The data in the table confirm that target 
firms relative to their bidders and on the average were smaller, more
Ill
variable, less leveraged, had smaller market to book value ratio and had 
lower price-earning ratio.
Table 5-11 presents a comparison of the cumulative excess returns 
by method of payment, type of merger and regulation. The results show 
that the mean cumulative excess return is 27.695 percent for cash 
merger, while it is 16.369 percent for securities exchanges. The 
difference is statistically significant at the 1 percent level 
(t-statistic 3.717). Table 5-11 indicates that even though the returns 
for pure conglomerate mergers, 26.841 percent, is higher than the
returns from conglomerate merger, 21.578 percent, and higher than in 
non-conglomerate mergers, 22.210 percent, the difference is not statis­
tically significant. When we consider the effect of regulation, the 
results indicate that for the period after 1968 the mean of CER is 
23.636 percent, which is higher than 15.681 percent for the period 
before 1968, and the difference is statistically significant 
(t-statistic 2.248) at one percent level. This also indicates that
regulation has had a positive impact on the returns of the target 
stockholders.
Table 5-12 presents a portfolio comparison of the cumulative excess 
returns for each relative variable. The first entry of the table shows 
that small targets relative to the bidder (RSIZE-portfolio 1) earn 
higher returns than large targets. The first portfolio, which includes 
targets with relative size of 0.14-4.47 percent relative to their 
bidder, has a mean CER of 27.99%, while the mean of CER of the fifth
portfolio, which includes large targets relative to their bidder, is
Table 5-11
Cumulative Excess Returns Comparison by Method of Payment, Type of Merger 
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*Siynificant at 0.01 level.
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Table 5-12
Cumulative Excess Returns Portfolio Comparison for the Independent Variables
to Target Firms Stockholders
Number % of the Mean t-Stati sties of the Mean partfolio Oi fference
Relative of Relati ve of CER Portfolio Portfolio Portfolio Portfolio Portfolio






























RVAR 1 41 32.60-101.30 11.104 ---  -0.772 -3.132* -3.702* -4.141*
RVAR 2 41 101.50-135.80 13.945 -2.788* -3.430* -3.917*
RVAR 3 41 137.10-164.10 25.792 -0.670 -0.634
RVAR 4 41 164.20-208.4 29.382 --- 0.1U9
RVAR 5 40 210.2 -391.40 28.829 -
RTQR 1 41 5.83- 37.69 29.587 ---  1.419 3.374* 1.364 1.593
RTQR 2 41 38.49- 65.39 22.084 --- 2.116* -0.088 0.127
RTQR 3 41 65.69- 80.18 12.084 -2.259* -2.105*
RTQR 4 41 80.88-130.46 22.492 -0
RTQR 5 40 130.52-388.97 21.510
RPER 1 41 8.02- 50.14 23.056 ---  0.190 0.156 0.303 0.695
RPER 2 41 51.14- 78.86 22.039 --- -0.014 0.107 0.543
RPER 3 41 79.96-104 22.211 0.150 0.575
RPER 4 41 104.76-154.73 21.506 0.465
RPER 5 40 156.01-453.72 19.568
ROER 1 41 1.24- 46.03 17.679 ......... 1.438 0.284 -2.317* -0.599
RDER 2 41 46.59- 72.95 24.408 --- 1.821 -0.932 0.783
RDER 3 41 73.91-117.46 16.525 -2.729* -0.909
ROER 4 41 117.89-182.12 29.274 --- 1.662
ROER 5 40 186.09-438.39 20.516
* Significance at 0.01 level. 113
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12.573 percent. The difference is statistically significant at one 
percent level (t-value of 3.498).
Table 5-12 also indicates that as the variability of target in­
creased relative to their bidders, the return to target increased. The 
mean CER for the first RVAR portfolio is 11.104 percent, while the 
return is 28.829 for the fifth portfolio. The difference is statis­
tically significant at one percent level (t-value is -4.141). The 
result also shows that the returns to target firms with low Tobin's 
Q-ratio (RTQR) relative to the bidder has higher returns, 29.587 
percent, while the mean of CER is 21.510 percent for target with high 
Tobin's Q-ratio relative to their bidders. No significant difference 
exists between relative price-earning ratio portfolios.
Table 5-13A reports the regression coefficients and t-statistics 
associated with each variable. Of all the variables used, only four
were found to be significant: the variable of the relative variance,
relative Tobin's Q-ratio, the variable for pure conglomerate, and the 
variable for the payment method.
The regression constant of 7.174 percent measures the expected 
average cumulative excess returns to the target firms from merger when 
the market value of the target firms is equal to the market value of the 
bidder, when the variance, price earning ratio, debt equity ratio and 
Tobin's Q-ratio of both the target and the bidders are equal and when 
the merger bid occurs after 1968, by securities or combination and the 
type of merger is conglomerate or non-conglomerate. The comparison of 
the mean cumulative excess returns of 21.686 percent from Table 5-10 
with the constant 7.174 percent indicates that failure to account for
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Table 5-13A
The Cross S ec tio n a l Model to  T arget Firms S tockholders 
Dependent V ariab le  CER form t-2 0  th ru  to
V ariab le
R egression
C o e ff ic ie n t t-V alue P ro b a b ili ty
In te rc e p t 7.1>4 2.14* 0.6338 0.0338
LRS1ZE -  1.727 -0 .6 0 U.5462 0.5462
LRVAR 35.074 3.85* 0.0002 0.0002
LRPER 1.644 0.32 0.7526 0.7526
LRDEK -  0.343 -0 .10 0.9218 0.9218
LRTQR -  8.172 -1.66** 0.0994
CASH 9.393 3.21* 0.0015 0.0015
PUKE-CONGL 7.162 2.38* 0.0181 0.0181
REGUL - 2.237 -0 .65 0.5181 0.5181
R-Square * 21.338*
F-Value = 6 .61
PR > F = 0.0001
Number o f O b serva tions = 204
* S ig n if ic a n c e  a t  5 p e rcen t lev e l
•♦ S ig n if ic a n c e  a t 10 p e rcen t lev e l
The L p re f ix  in  th e  v a r ia b le  symbols in d ic a te s  th e  use of 
lo g a rith m ic  va lues fo r  th e se  v a r ia b le s .
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these factors may overestimate the returns to target firms from merger. 
The relative size variables are not significant and even have the wrong 
sign. This is consistent with Asquith, Bruner and Mullins (1983) in 
which they found that log of the relative size is not a significant 
variable to explain the return to target firms stockholders, and it is 
in contrast to Papaioannou (1984) in which he found this variable is 
significant and has a positive sign.
The relative variance variable is highly significant (t-value 
3.85), and it has a positive sign which implies that the higher the 
variability of the target relative to the bidder, the higher the returns 
to target firms from merger. This finding is also supported if we 
examine Table 5-12. When the relative variance variable is divided into 
five portfolios (from lowest to highest relative variance), the result 
indicates that the first portfolio has a mean of CER of 11.104 percent 
while the fifth portfolio, which includes the highest relative variance, 
has a mean of CAR of 28.829 percent. The difference is statistically 
significant between the two (t-value -4.141). The fact that the mean of 
the relative variance is 1.570 as indicated by Table 5-10 suggests that, 
on the average, targets have higher variance than the bidder. This 
finding is not consistent with Galai and Masulis (1976), Shastri (1982) 
argument of the wealth transfer while it is consistent with the 
diversification effect hypotheses, and the RVAR variable has the 
expected positive sign with the CER to target firms. Furthermore, Table 
5-13A reveals that neither the relative price-earning ratio nor the 
relative debt equity ratio is significant in explaining the returns to 
stockholders of the target firms, which does not give support to the
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price-earning ratio or debt capacity hypotheses. The insignificance of 
the price-earnings ratio relative is in contrast to the findings of 
Nielsen and Melicher (1973) who reported a positive significant effect 
on merger premiums. This result is also supported by Table 5-12. The 
entry concerning relative price earning ratio shows no significant 
difference between the mean of CER of any portfolio. Also, the entry 
concerning relative debt equity ratio shows no statistical difference 
between the mean of CER for portfolios one and five or portfolios two 
and four.
The relative Tobin’s Q-ratio variable turns out to be significant 
at 10 percent level (t-value 1.66) but it carries the wrong sign. The 
significance of this variable is consistent with the undervaluation 
hypotheses, and it is consistent with the findings of Walking and 
Edmister (1985) and Papaioannou (1984) who found this variable to be 
significant in explaining the bid premium. We can argue also that this 
variable would measure the extent of managerial efficiency. More 
efficient management would produce higher market to book ratios, and 
inefficiency would cause lower values of this variable and invite 
takeover.
The cross-sectional model for the target stockholder indicates that 
the dummy variable for the method of payment is significant at 5 percent 
level, were cash mergers are associated with higher CER to target stock­
holders than other methods of payment. This result is supported also by
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the results from Table 5-11 where the mean of CER of cash mergers is 
27.695 percent while the corresponding value is 16.369 percent for 
securities exchange. The t-statistic for the mean difference is 3.717, 
which is significant at the five percent: level. These results are 
consistent with the findings of Wansley, Lane and Yang (1983) were they 
found that cash mergers provide higher returns than security mergers for 
the stockholders of the target firms. The difference is attributed to 
the accounting and the tax treatment of mergers.
The dummy variables for merger types, which differentiate between 
pure conglomerate versus all other types is significant at one percent 
level. It indicates that pure conglomerate are associated with higher 
returns to stockholders of the target firms. This finding is supportive 
of Lewellen's (1971) argument that financial benefits will result from 
mergers and are more likely to be related to conglomerate mergers than 
non-conglomerates. The finding also is in contrast to Schall (1972) and 
Rubenstein (1973) argument that in the absence of real synergies, 
mergers will not affect the value of the firms. This result is 
consistent with Elgers and Clark (1982) who found that higher returns 
are associated more with pure conglomerates than non-conglomerates, 
while Wansley, Lane and Yang (1983) found no significant difference 
between the two types of mergers.
The last variable included to measure the effect of regulation 
indicates that regulation has a positive impact on the returns to target 
stockholders, even though the variable is not significant. It has the 
correct sign as hypothesized. Also, Table 5-11 produces significant
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Table 5-13B
The Cross s e c tio n a l Model to  T arget Firms S tockholders 
Dependent V ariable  CEK from t - 1  th ru  t 0 .
V a riab les
R egression
C o e ff ic ie n t t-V a lu e P ro b a b ili ty
In te rc e p t 2.90S 1.05 0.293b
IRS1ZE -3 .1 8 0 -1 .36 U.1770
LRVAR 7.123 0.95 0.342b
LRPER - S .574 -1 .30 0.1942
LRDER -3 .673 -1 .2 8 0.202b
LRTQR -2 .845 -0 .7 0 0.4835
CASH 5.905 2.46* '0.0148
PURE-CONGL 2.324 0.94 0.3474
REGUL -3 .003 -1 .06 0.2915
R-Square * 8.907%
F-Value -  2 .38
PR > F * 0.018
Number o f  O bserva tions * 204
•S ig n if ic a n c e  a t  6 percen t lev e l
The L p re f ix  1n th e  v a r ia b le  symbols in d ic a te  th e  use of 
lo g arith m ic  v a lu es fo r  th e se  v a r ia b le s .
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Table 5-14
Distribution of the Cumulative Excess Returns to 
Stockholders and to the Bondholders of the 
Merging Firms by the Announcement Year
Stock Returns Bond Returns
Year Average CER from t-20 thru tQ Average CER from t-20 thru to
  Target___________________ Bidder Target___________________ Bidder
63 12.336 -0.611 -3.082
64 19.045 0.143 ---- -0.089
65 11.006 0.672 0.518 -0.0104
66 14.319 -1.350 ---- 0.353
67 15.539 0.936 2.534 -0.883
68 10.407 2.067 -3.000 3.067
69 13.619 4.827 0.625 -2.209
70 23.295 4.299 0.833 0.360
71 9.285 1.221 ---- 0.001
72 23.973 -0.944 0.485 0.349
73 18.289 3.320 -0.493 -0.604
74 39.519 2.828 2.182 1.189
75 23.481 -0.748 ---- 6.098
76 19.103 -1.943 ---- 0.286
77 33.274 -2.948 0.085 2.704
78 32.093 -0.999 -2.321 -0.2603
79 27.945 2.916 -1.042 0.728
80 10.976 3.741 0.787 2.173
81 19.285 -0.980 4.693 0.761
82 24.927 3.211 ---- -0.776
*No bonds in this year for the target firms.
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results when the effect of regulation is considered by itself. The
period after 1968 has a mean of CER of 23.636 percent while that of the 
period before 1968 is 15.681 percent. The mean difference is statis­
tically significant with t-value of 2.248. These results are consistent 
with Jarrell and Bradley (1980) who found that the premium paid to
regulated targets is higher than unregulated targets. This finding also 
gives support to the arguments that the returns from mergers are chang­
ing over time. To provide more evidence about this point, we include 
Table 5-14, which presents a distribution of the cumulative excess 
returns to stockholders and bondholders of the merging firm. Visual 
inspection of the table shows that the CER is changing over time. This
finding is consistent with Asquith, Bruner and Mullins (1983) who found
this variable to be significant and it also has the same sign.
The cross-sectional model to stockholders of the target firms 
explains 21.34 percent of the cumulative excess returns. The overall 
model has F-value of 6.61 which is significant at 0.01 percent level. 
It produces four significant variables: relative variance, relative
Tobin's Q-ratio, dummy variables for payment method and merger type.
The second model in Table 5-13B, which uses the CER from day -1 to 
day 0, shows that the dummy variable for the method of payment is the 
only significant variable. The model has R-square of 8.907 percent, and 




Table 5-15 presents a cumulative excess return comparison by the 
method of payment, type of merger and the effect of regulation. The 
first panel shows that cash mergers are associated with higher mean CER 
(1.167%) relative to securities exchange (0.491%), but the difference is 
not statistically significant. Table 5-15 also indicates that the mean 
CER from t_2Q t îru to ^or Pure conglomerate merger is 3.464 percent 
relative to 1.017 percent for conglomerate merger. The difference is 
statistically significant at the 5 percent level. Pure conglomerate is 
also associated with higher mean CER relative to non-conglomerate of 
-1.490 percent. The difference is statistically significant at one 
percent level (t-value of 2.163). The result of regulation effect is 
not consistent with the hypothesized effect. It indicates that for the 
period after regulation the bidder firms mean CER is positive, 1.338 
percent, while it is -1.728 for the period before 1968.
Table 5-16 presents a portfolio comparison of the mean CER where 
each relative variable is divided into five portfolios (from the lowest 
to the highest percentage). The comparison among the portfolios of the 
relative size indicated that as the relative size of the target to 
bidder increased, the mean CER to the bidder also increased. The mean 
CER for the second portfolio is -1.398, while it is 3.540 for the fifth 
portfolio. The difference is statistically significant at the one 
percent level (t-value of -2.075).
The classification by relative variance shows no significant 
difference between any two portfolios, even though the first portfolio 
is associated with mean CER of 2.792 percent which is higher than the
Cumulative Excess Returns Comparison by Method of Payment, Type of Merger and 



















Cash 96 1.167 ---  0.529 --- -- -- -- ---
Securities 90 0.491 ----  --- --- — ----
Type of '
Merger:
Conglomerate 169 1.017 --- -1.666** 1.326 ---
Pure
Conglomerate 71 3.464 2.163* --- ---
Non-
Conglomerate 35 -1.490 ----
Regulation:
After 1968 154 1.338 -- 1.868**
Before 1968 50 -1.728 ---
* Significance at 0.01 level.
‘‘Significance at 0.05 level.
Table b-16
Cumulative Excess Returns Portfolio Comparison of the 
Independent Variables toBidder Firm Stockholders
Number % of the ' Mean t-Statistics of the Mean Difference
Relati ve of Relative of CER Portfolio Portfolio Portfolio Portfolio Portfolio
Variables Fi rms Variables -2 0 ,0 1 2 3 4 5
RSlZ 1 41 U. 1 4 - "  4."47" 0.731 ------ 1.167 -0.053 -0.099 -1.11b
RSIZ 2 41 4.54- 11.36 -1.398 -1.315 -1.095 -2.075*
RSIZ 3 41 11.44- 24.59 0.831 --- -0.058 -1.119
RSIZ 4 41 24.94- 54.56 0.958 ---- -0.936
RSIZ 5 40 55.15-199.28 3.540
RVAR 1 41 32.60-101.30 2.792 ---  0.637 0.819 1.089 0.994
RVAR 2 41 101.50-135.80 0.983 ---- 0.194 0.608 0.469
RVAR 3 41 137.10-164.10 0.636 ---- 0.518 0.351
RVAR 4 41 164.20-208.40 -0.227 ---- -0.162
RVAR 5 40 210.2 -391.40 0.069 ----
RTQR 1 41 5.83- 37.69 0.624 ---  0.119 1.174 -0.712 -1.582
RTQR 2 41 38.49- 65.39 0.356 ---- 1.365 -0.966 -1.462
RTQR 3 41 65.69- 80.18 -1.924 --- -2.104* -1.824**
RTQR 4 41 80.88-130.46 2.453 ---- -0.412
RTQR 5 40 130.52-383.97 3.455 ----
RPER 1 41 80.2 - 50.14 -1.911 ---  -1.283 -1.548 -1.681** -1.949**
RPER 2 41 51.14- 78.86 0.539 ---- -0.243 -0.619 -0.292
RPER 3 41 79.96-104.0 1.045 ---- -0.419 -RJ.057
RPER 4 41 104.76-154.73 2.106 --- 0.3b0
RPER 5 40 156.01- 45.72 1.169 ----
ROER 1 41 1.24- 46.03 0.433 ---  -1.520 0.737 -0.069 -0.056
RDER 2 41 46.59- 72.95 4.614 ---- 2.580* 1.733* l.b95**
RDER 3 41 73.91-117.46 -1.219 ---- -1.085 -1.013
RDER 4 41 117.89-182.12 0.593 ---- 0.016
RDER 5 40 186.09-438.39 0.564 ----
* Significance at 0.01 level. 
**Siynificance at 0.05 level.
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fifth portfolio mean CER of 0.069 percent. The classification by 
relative Tobin's Q-ratio and relative price-earning ratio shows the same 
pattern of mean CER, from t_2Q thru tQ, as the percentage increases, but 
that pattern does not exist for the relative debt equity ratio.
The regression coefficients and t-statistics are reported in Table 
5-17A where the dependent variable is the cumulative excess returns of 
day -1 and day 0. The second model is reported in Table 5-17B where the 
dependent variable is the cumulative excess returns from day -20 today 
0. The regression constant of 1.329 percent measures the expected 
average cumulative excess returns for a merger bid when the size of the 
target firms is equal to the size of the bidder, when the variance, 
price-earnings ratio, Tobin's Q-ratio, and debt equity ratio for both 
the bidder and the target are equal and when the bid occurs before 1968. 
The expected average cumulative excess returns for the bidder firms is 
positive and statistically significant at 0.01 level (t-value of 2.52).
The estimated size coefficient measures the relationship between 
the log of the firm's relative size and the cumulative excess returns to 
the bidding firm. The log of the relative size (LRSIZE) has a positive 
sign, and it is significant at 10 percent level. This means that as the 
relative size of the target to the bidder increased, the cumulative 
excess returns increased. This result is also supported by Table 5-16. 
The first and second portfolios are associated with mean CER of 0.731 
and -1.398 percent respectively, while the fourth and fifth portfolios' 
mean CERs are 0.958 and 3.540 percent, respectively. The difference 
between the second and fifth portfolios is statistically significant 
(t-value of -2.075).
Table 5-17A
The Cross Sectional Model to the Bidding Firms Stockholders 




Intercept 1.329 2 .b 2 * 0.0125
LRSIZE 0.758 1.69^ 0.0925
LRVAR -2.137 -1.49 0.1370
LRPER -0.723 -0.88 0.3774
LRDER 0.620 1.13 0.2604
LKTQR -0.653 -0.84 0.4003
CASH -0.075 -0.16 0.8697
PURE-CONGL 1.277 2 .1 1 * 0.0074
REGUL -1.334 - 2 A b * 0.0149
R-Square = 12.309
F-Value = 3.42
PR > F = 0.0010
Number of Observations - 204
* Significance at 5 percent level
♦♦Significance at 10 percent level
The L prefix in the variable symbols indicates the use of 
logarithmic values for these variables.
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The sign and the significance of this variable is consistent with 
the Asquith, Bruner and Mullins (1983) finding of a positive relation 
between the relative size and the cumulative excess returns. They 
explain that under the assumption that mergers benefit the acquiring 
firms, then large mergers should show up as having larger returns to 
acquiring firms. Roll (1984) argues that this positive relation between 
relative size and CER "... is consistent with the bidding firm losing on 
average, but losing less the larger the targets" (Roll, 1984, p. 23).
This finding is at least not consistent with the managerialism 
theory as a motive of merger since size has a positive, not a negative, 
impact on the returns to bidding firm's stockholders.
The cross-sectional model shows that relative variance variable is 
not significant. This is also supported by the results of Table 5-16 
where the relative variable portfolios do not show any significant 
difference between the mean CER of any two portfolios. The relative 
price earning ratio is not significant, and it carries the wrong sign. 
This is additional evidence on Lintner's (1971) argument that the market 
evaluates the combined earnings of the two firms at a higher price 
earning ratio than that of the acquiring firms, so the increase in 
earnings per share from PER differences will tend to raise the stock­
holders' assessments of the future earnings. This will lead to an 
increase in the market value of both firms' securities. This argument 
is not supported either by the sign or the significance of the LRPER 
variable. The relative debt equity ratio variable has a positive sign,
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as predicted, but it is not significant. Also, the variable of relative 
Tobin's Q-ratio is not significant. This implies that debt capacity and 
the undervaluation hypotheses is not a valid argument to explain the 
return to stockholders of the bidding firms. The dummy variable for the 
method of payment is not significant. This result is supported by the 
results of Table 5-15 which Indicates that even though the mean CER for 
cash merger is 1.167 percent which is higher than 0.491 percent for the 
securities exchange mergers, the difference is not statistically sig-. 
nificant.
The dummy variable for merger type is significant at 0.007 level 
(t-value of 2.71), and it carries the correct sign. This finding is 
supported by Table 5-15, which indicates that there is a statistically 
significant difference between the mean CER for pure conglomerate 
mergers, 3.464 percent, and non-conglomerate mergers, -1.490 percent. 
The mean difference is statistically significant (t-value of 2.163). 
The table also shows that pure conglomerate mergers are associated with 
higher mean CER, 3.464 percent, than all conglomerate mergers, 1.017 
percent. The difference is statistically significant (t-value of 
1.656). This result supports Lewellen's (1971) arguments and it 
contradicts Schall's and Rubenstein's (1973) arguments which were 
explained before. The result concerning merger type is also consistent 
with Elgers and Clark (1980) and Wansley, Lane and Yang (1983).
The last variable, REGUL, which was used as a proxy to capture the 
effect of regulation, is significant (t-value of -2.46). This is also 
supported by the results of Table 5-16 which indicates that for the
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period after regulation, the mean CER for the bidding firm is higher 
(1.338 percent) than the period before regulation (-1.728 percent). The 
mean difference is statistically significant (t-value of 1.858). This 
finding is not consistent with Jarrell and Bradley (1980) and Schipper 
and Tompson (1983) who found that regulatory changes had significantly 
adverse impact on shares values of acquiring firms even though the 
difference between this result and theirs is not clear. One possible 
explanation is that over the period from 1968 (the year when the 
regulation was imposed) and 1982, many factors could have affected the 
returns to bidding firms' stockholders that may have cancelled the 
negative impact of the regulation. This result is also consistent with 
the large number of mergers occurring during 1976 and 1977, which 
suggest that regulation does not have an adverse effect on the returns 
to stockholders of the bidding firms.
Table 5-17B presents the cross-sectional model for the bidding 
firms' stockholders when the cumulative excess returns from t £q to 
is used as dependent variable. The results show that only relative 
variance and the dummy variable for merger type is significant. The 
first model table (5-17A) is more powerful since it explains 12.31 
percent of the cumulative excess returns. It has F-value of 3.42, which 
is significant at 0.10 percent level, relative to R-square of 9.971 
percent and F-value of 2.7 for the second model.
To examine the overpayment hypothesis, which implies that the 
bidder overpay for the security of the targets, the first model in Table 
5-17A is modified to include the returns for the target as independent 
variables. As the hypotheses implies, the return to target should be
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Table 5-17B
The Cross Sectional Model to Biddiny Firms Stockholders 




Intercept 1.089 0.65 0.5146
LRSIZE - 0.469 -0.680 0.4956
LRVAR -12.077 -2.67* 0.0083
LRPER 0.402 0.16 0.8766
LRDER - 0.238 -0.14 0.8912
LRTQR 2.854 1.16 0.2459
CASH 0.719 t).50 0.6210
PURE-CONGL 4.105 2.75* 0.0065
REGUL - 2.814 -1.64 0.1030
R-Square = 9.971%
F-Value = 2.70
PR > F = 0.0077
Number of Observations = 204
♦Significance at 5 percent level
The L prefix in the variable symbols indicates the use of 
logarithmic values for these variables.
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Table 5-17C
The Cross Sectional Model to Bidding Firms Stockholders Where KETT1, CAK 
from t-1 thru tO, Dependent Variable CER from t-1 thru to.
Variables
Regression 
Coef fi cil ent t-Value Probabi1ity
Intercept 1.310 2.47* 0.0142
RETT1 0.006 0.48 0.6322
LRSIZE 0.779 1.73** 0.0859
LRVAR -2.184 -1.52 0.1303
LRPER 0.687 -0.83 0.4049
LRDER 0.644 1.17 0.2452
LRTOR -0.635 -0.82 0.4155
CASH -0.114 -0.24 0.8070
PURE-CONGL 1.262 2.66* 0.0084
REGUL -1.314 -2.41* 0.0169
R-Square = 12.413
F-Value = 3.06
PR > F = 0.0020
Number of Observations = 2U4
* Significant at 5 percent level
♦‘Significant a t 10 percent level
The L prefix in the variable symbols indicates the use of 
logarithmic values for these variables.
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negatively related to the returns of the bidder, which implies that the 
independent variable (RETT1) should have a negative sign and 
significant. Table 5-17C presents the estimated model when the returns 
to target are included as dependent variable. The model produces the 
same results as the model in Table 5-17A. The variable (RETT1) has a 
positive sign, and it is not significant which contradicts overpayment 
hypotheses by the bidding firms.
Target Bondholders
Table 5-18A presents the cross-sectional model for the bondholders 
of the target firms when the returns are calculated as the change in 
prices or [(P ^  10^’ where P is the price ten days before
the announcement and Pq is the announcement price. The model does not 
include the dummy variables. This is due to the small number of obser­
vations. The model also does not include relative Tobin’s Q-ratio 
because it is highly correlated with the debt equity ratio.
Table 5-18A shows that the regression constant of -6.556 percent is 
significant at 0.01 percent level. This measures the expected average 
excess returns for a merger bid when the independent variables are held 
constant. The relative variance variable is significant and has a 
positive sign as hypothesized, which gives support to the 
diversification effect hypotheses. The relative debt-equity ratio 
variables also turns out to be significant (t-value of 2.19) and it has 
a positive sign as predicted by Table 2-2. This result is consistent 
with arguments of Lintner (1971) and Levy and Sarnat (1970), when they 
argue that joining together less than perfectly correlated income
Table 5-18A
The Cross Sectional Model to Target Firms Bondholders




Intercept -6.556 -5.□!♦ 0.0001
RSIZE 0.373 0.46 0.6490
RVAR 1.197 1.76** 0.0937
RPER 2.788 3 .81* 0.0011
RDER 1.336 2 .19* 0.0405
R-Square = 58.293%
F-Value = 6.99
PR > F = 0.0011 
Number of Observations = 25 
* Significance at 5 percent level 
♦♦Significance at 10 percent level.
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streams through merger will reduce the lenders risk. This will lead to 
an increase in the market value of the merging firm’s securities. This 
finding is also consistent with the argument that merger will reduce the 
borrowing costs as a result of increasing the size, which will be
reflected in terms of positive excess returns to the merging firms 
securityholders. The relative price-earning variable is significant 
(t-value of 3.81) and it has a positive sign as hypothesized in Table 
2-2, while the relative size variable, even though it has a positive 
sign as predicted, is not statistically significant.
The first model in Table 5-18A explains 58.293% of the variation. 
It has F-value of 6.99 which is significant at 0.11 level. The second 
model produces one significant variable, the relative debt equity ratio. 
It has R-square of 17.745 percent, but it has a low F-value of 1.08
which is not significant.
Bidders Bondholders
Table 5-19A presents the cross-sectional model to bidding firms 
when the returns are defined as the change in prices from t_^g to t^. 
The model shows that it does not have explanatory power nor is any of 
the explanatory variable significant. Table 5-19B presents the cross- 
sectional model when the excess returns of day -1 and day zero, used as 
dependent variables. The model indicates that the relative variance
variable is significant at 5 percent level. The relative debt equity 
ratio is also significant, the two variable has a positive sign as
predicted in Table 2-2.
Table 5-18B
The Cross Sectional Model to Target Firms Bondholders




Intercept -1.798 -1.73** 0.0995
RSIZE -0.69 -1.08 0.2950
RVAR 0.101 0.19 0.8545
RPER 0.821 1.41 0.1743
RDER 0.847 1.75** 0.0963
R-Square = 17.745%
F-Value = 1.08
PR > F = 0.3934 
Number of Observations = 25 
**Significance at 10 percent level.
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The significance of relative variance variable is consistent with 
the diversification effect hypotheses, while the significance of 
relative debt-equity ratiois consistent with the leverage effect 
hypotheses developed in Chapter 2. The model explains 21.09 percent of 
the variability and it has F-ratio of 3.27 which is significant at 0.018 
level.
Table 5-19A
The Cross Sectional Model to Bidding Firms Bondholders




Intercept 0.309 0.16 0.8723
RSIZE -0.062 -0.04 0.9689
RVAR -0.130 -0.15 0.8782
RPER -0.273 -0.58 0.564
RDER 0.448 0.69 0.493
R-Square = 3.152% 
F-Value = 0.40 
PR > F = 0.8085
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Table 5-19B
The Cross Sectional Model to Bidding Firms Bondholders




Intercept -2.334 -1,89* 0.0645
RSIZE 1.002 0.99 0.3283
RVAR 1.168 2.14* 0.0375
RPER 0.094 0.32 0.7467
RDER 0.702 1.67** 0.0030
R-Square = 21.090 
F-Value = 3.27
PR > F = 0.0186 
* Significant at 5 percent level 




This final chapter of the study covers concluding remarks. The 
conclusions drawn from the results and the implications of the study are 
considered in the first section. The second section is a discussion of 
the limitations. The final section includes some suggestions for future 
research.
Conclusion and Implications 
The objective of the first part of this study is to re-examine the 
returns of the four classes of security holders around the announcement 
of completed mergers. Examination of the returns to target stockholders 
indicates that there is a large positive excess return earned by the 
stockholders of the acquired firms on the day of the merger announcement 
and the day before. The average excess returns on day zero is A.82 
percent with a t-statistics of 7.47. On day -1, the average excess 
returns is 4.31 percent with t-statistic of 8.89. The cumulative excess 
returns from t_2Q through the merger announcement day, t^, is 19.59 
percent. The result also indicates that there is a large positive 
excess return for the period immediately prior to the announcement date. 
This pattern of abnormal returns is explained by the leakage of informa­
tion about the merger before it appears in the Wall Street Journal, but
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still the excess returns on day t^ and t  ̂ dominate all other daily 
returns.
The results of the bidding firms stockholders shows that there is 
little market reaction on the announcement day, even though the two-day 
excess returns are 0.31 percent, which is significant at the 0.01 level. 
The t-statistic is 2.48 for the portfolio of two days announcement. 
Over the entire 41-day period, the stockholders of the bidding firms 
earn 1.21 percent which is statistically significant at 0.01 level with 
a t-statistic of 2.3.
To examine the returns to target bondholders from merger, the 
average abnormal returns were generated using the mean adjusted returns 
model, for ten days before to ten days after merger announcement. The 
results indicate that there are twelve days with negative returns versus 
nine days of positive returns, and the largest significant returns occur 
on day zero where the average abnormal return is -0.66 percent, with a 
t-statistic of 2.364, which is statistically significant at 0.01 level. 
The cumulative average abnormal return for day t_^ and day zero is 
-0.701 percent with a t-statistic of -1.778 which not significant at 
0.01 level. The cumulative excess returns from t ^  to t ^ is -0.209, 
while it is 0.667 for the period from to t+io* T^ese results
indicate that target bondholders do not gain from mergers and a likely 
explanation to the small negative insignificant returns is because of 
the loss of assets that serve as collateral to secure their debt. The 
loss of collateral occurs because whether they are secured or unsecured, 
bondholders have a priority in the event of default only to assets owned 
by the target. The second reason is that when the bidding firms
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considers the payment to bondholders of the target, they consider the 
present value of the amount to be paid in the future. If the bonds have 
been issued at an interest rate that is substantially below the present 
effective rate for a similar security, then the price will decrease and 
the returns will be negative to the target bondholders. The result to 
target bondholders is not consistent with the wealth transfer hypotheses 
and does not give support to the argument that bondholders share some of 
the synergy with shareholders.
Unlike target bondholders, the results to bidding firms bondholders 
indicate that the largest average abnormal returns of 0.689 percent 
occurred at day t and it is statistically significant with a 
t-statistic of 4.65. The cumulative average excess returns during day 
t  ̂ and tp shows an average excess return of 0.859 percent with a 
t-statistic of 4.095. Over the 21 day period, bidding firms bondholders 
earn 1.912 percent with a t-statistic of 2.812. This finding is consis­
tent with the information effect hypotheses about merger and the concept 
that bondholders share some of the synergy with the shareholders. The 
evidence does not support the transfer hypotheses as a result of the 
diversification or the incentive effect.
The second objective of this study is to identify the source of 
gains or losses to each group of security holders. This involved the 
estimation of a cross-sectional regression model for each of the four 
groups of security holders. The dependent variable for the stockholders 
of the merging firms is defined in two ways: 1) the cumulative excess
returns for day -20 to day zero and 2) the cumulative excess returns 
from day -1 to day zero. While the independent variables include the
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log of relative size, relative variance, relative price-earnings ratio, 
relative debt equity ratio and relative Tobin's Q-ratio, the model also 
includes a dummy variable for method of payment, type of merger and the 
effect of regulation. A portfolio comparison procedure is performed by 
sorting each of the relative variables from the highest to the lowest 
value. Then the total sample is divided into five portfolios. Then we 
examine the mean difference between the mean of the cumulative excess 
returns for each portfolio. The results for each group of security 
holders can be summarized by the following:
A. Target Stockholders
The cross-sectional model to the target firms stockholders indicate 
that relative variability, relative Tobin's Q-ratio and the dummy 
variables for method of payment and type of merger are significant 
variables to explain the excess returns to target stockholders. The 
model explains 21.338 percent of the variability and it has F-value of 
6.61, which is significant at the 0.01 percent level.
The significance of the relative variance is supported also by the 
portfolio comparison procedure since the mean difference between the 
first and the fifth mean CER portfolios is statistically significant 
(t-value of -4.141), a result which is consistent with the 
diversification effect hypotheses. The significance of Tobin's Q-ratio 
is in support of the undervaluation hypotheses, while the significance 
of the dummy variables for method of payment and type of merger imply 
that cash mergers are associated with higher cumulative excess returns 
than security exchange and that pure conglomerate is associated with
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higher returns than other types of mergers. This implies that financial 
benefits will result from mergers and are more likely to be related to 
pure conglomerate than non-conglomerate mergers.
The variables of relative size, relative price earning ratio, and 
relative debt equity are not significant, which implies that the price 
earning ratio and debt capacity hypotheses are not supported by the 
cross-sectional model, even though the RPER variable has the predicted 
sign.
B. Bidder Stockholders;
Results of the cross-sectional regression model to bidding firms 
stockholders indicates that relative size variable is significant. This 
implies that bidding firms earn higher return by acquiring large targets 
relative to their firms than if they acquire small targets. This 
finding is not consistent with managerialism hypotheses. The positive 
relationship may be justified on the basis that large firms are able to 
pay a premium for the stock of small firms since they will be able to 
discount the same cash flows at a smaller discount rate. The second 
significant variable is the dummy variable for merger type, which 
implies that pure conglomerate mergers are associated with higher 
cumulative excess returns than non-conglomerate mergers. Thus, finan­
cial benefits may result from a merger, and more likely to be related to 
pure conglomerate mergers than non-conglomerate mergers. This conclu­
sion is supported also by the portfolio comparison where the mean CER
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for conglomerate merger is 3.464 percent relative to -1.490 percent for 
non-conglomerate. The mean difference is significant with t-value of 
2.163.
The dummy variable of the regulation effect is significant, but has 
the wrong sign. It indicates that the cumulative excess returns after 
1968 is higher than the cumulative excess returns before 1968. This 
indicates that regulation does not have an adverse impact on the bidder 
stockholders. The independent variables of relative variance, relative 
price earning ratio, relative debt equity ratio, relative Tobin's 
Q-ratio and the dummy variable for the method of payment are not signif­
icant. The model explains 12.309 percent of the variation, and it has 
F-value of 3.42, which is significant at 0.10 percent level.
C. Target Bondholders:
Results to target firms bondholders show that relative variance, 
relative debt equity ratio, and relative price-earning ratio are signif­
icant variables. The regression constant of -6.556 percent, which 
measures the expected average excess returns, implies that failure to 
account for the variables which are included in the model leads to an 
overestimate of the return to the target bondholders. The significance 
of the relative variance with the positive sign as predicted, gives 
support to the diversification effect hypotheses, while the significance 
of relative debt equity ratio variable implies that, since debt equity 
ratio of the target is greater the debt equity ratio of the bidder, 
merger will produce a leverage ratio which is greater than bidder debt
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equity ratio but less than target debt equity ratio. This implies that 
target bondholders will experience reduction in the risk of default, and 
the market value of their bonds will increase, an argument which is 
consistent with the leverage effect hypotheses. The cross-sectional 
model explains 58.293 percent of the variation, and it has F-value of 
6.99 which is significant at 0.11 percent level.
D. Bidders Bondholders:
The cross-sectional model to bidding firms bondholders when the 
dependent variable is defined as the sum of the excess returns of day 
t  ̂ and zero, indicates that the relative variance and the relative debt 
equity ratio is significant which gives support to the diversification 
and leverage effect hypotheses respectively. The constant of -2.334 
percent indicates that the expected average excess return is 
significantly negative when we consider the variables in the model. The 
model explains 21.090 percent, and it has F-value of 3.27 which is 
significant at 1.86 percent level.
Limitations
Most empirical work makes some compromises and assumptions. There 
are a number of assumptions which have become conventional in finance 
literature. Although these assumptions might make us commit some 
biases, in order to make the empirical work possible, we have to live 
with them. A number of conventional assumptions were made, when needed, 
in this study.
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Bonds are characterized by the infrequency of trading. Hence, the 
problem of missing data, during some trading days, is a limitation 
facing any researcher wanting to utilize bond market daily data. In the 
meanwhile, corporate bond data is a hand collecting activity. There­
fore, neither a long observation period nor a relatively large sample 
can be chosen.
Another issue is the use of the market, model to generate residual 
around the announcement day. The existence of empirical evidence 
suggests that the residual from the market model could be related to 
other anomalies like variance, size, price-earning ratio, which is the 
same variable used in this study and in most of the cross-sectional 
studies to justify the abnormal returns to the merging firms. Thus, if 
one or more of these variables turns out to be significant, it is 
difficult to conclude that the significance of specific variable is due 
to the fact that it justifies the excess returns to the merging firms or 
because of the market model is misspecified. The results of this study 
may only be valid for completed mergers, and it may not be the same for 
all merger announcements when the merger is not completed.
Finally, daily bond prices are available only for those firms which 
have their bond issues listed in either NYSE or ASE. Since not as many 
bond issued as common stocks are listed in NYSE or ASE, a long study 
period must be chosen to have a reasonable sample. But the longer the 
study period, the higher the costs of collecting data.
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Suggestions for Future Research
An extension of this study is to examine the impact of merger 
announcement on other security holders, namely convertible and 
nonconvertible preferred stock and convertible bonds. Hence, we suggest 
this extension.
Even though most of the empirical work is concerned about the gain 
to stockholders of the merging firms, the cost associated with merger is 
neglected. Taking this cost into consideration would lower the gain to 
the merging firms, especially to the bidders firms.
The use of Arbitrage Pricing Model (APM) instead of the market 
model, to generate the abnormal performance around the event date may 
provide better estimate of the excess returns since there is a contro­
versy whether or not the capital asset pricing model is misspecified.
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Appendix A
Bond Sample of the Acquiring and Acquired Firms 
Associated with Announcements
Company Name Announcement Day Coupon Maturity
Acquiring Bonds Issues
1. Bangor Punta Corp. 19 Apr 1968 5.750 1992
2. Ashland Oil Inc. 23 Oct 1980 11.100 2004
3. Ashland Oil Inc. 23 Oct 1980 4.750 1993
4. Borden Inc. 08 Dec 1970 4.375 1991
5. Borden Inc. 08 Dec 1970 2.875 1981
6. Bendix Corporation 14 Dec 1979 9.250A 1981
7. Bendix Corporation 14 Dec 1979 9.350B 1981
8. Westinghouse Elec. 30 Sep 1970 5.375 1992
9. Atlantic Richfield 17 Sep 1965 2.625 1966
10. Warner Communication 26 Dec 1980 9.125 1996
11. General Elect Co. 16 Mar 1976 8.650 1984
12. General Elect Co. 16 Mar 1976 7.125 1978
13. General Elect Co. 16 Mar 1976 7.000A 1980
14. General Elect Co. 16 Mar 1977 7.000B 1979
15. General Mills 28 Oct 1977 8.875 1995
16. Exxon Corp. 25 May 1979 6.500 1998
17. Sears Robuck 29 Sep 1969 6.375 1993
18. Sears Robuck 29 Sep 1969 4.750 1983
19. Sears Robuck 29 Sep 1969 5.000 1982
20. Sears Robuck 29 Sep 1969 4.625 1972
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Company Name Announcement Day Coupon Maturity
Acquiring Bonds Issues
21. Armour 02 Apr 1965 5.000 1984
22. Armour 02 Apr 1965 4.500 1983
23. Standard Oil Corp. 13 Mar 1981 4.500 1983
24. Standard Oil Corp. 13 Mar 1981 6.000 1998
25. Standard Oil Corp. 13 Mar 1981 6.000 1989
26. Allied Corp. 04 Jan 1982 5.200 1991
27. Allied Corp. 04 Jan 1982 6.600 1993
28. Allied Corp. 04 Jan 1982 7,875 1996
29. Allied Corp. 04 Jan 1982 8.375 1983
30. American Can 28 Sep 1967 6.000 1997
31. American Can 28 Sep 1967 3.750 1988
32. American Can 28 Sep 1967 4.750 1990
33. Holiday Inn Inc. 04 Sep 1979 9.500 1995
34. L.T.V. Corp. 08 May 1968 5.000 1988
35. L.T.V. Corp. 08 May 1978 5.750 1965
36. Exxon Corp. 25 May 1979 6.000 1979
37. Interlake Inc. 14 Nov 1975 8.800 1996
38. Kennecot Corp. 16 Nov 1977 7.875 2001
39. Northwest Inds. Inc. 27 Jan 1976 7.500 1994
40. Northwest Inds. Inc. 14 Mar 1973 7.500 1994
41. Lear Siegler Inc. 16 Dec 1976 10.000 2004
42. Norton Simon Inc. 15 Jun 1977 6.000 1998
43. Signal Cos. Inc. 01 Mar 1978 8.850 1994
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Company Name Announcement Day Coupon Maturity
Acquiring Bonds Issues
44. Sinclair Oil Corp. 07 May 1964 4.600 1988
45. American Brands 14 Jan 1966 3.250 1977
46. American Brands 14 Jan 1966 3.000 1969
47. Continental Oil 13 Oct 1965 4.500 1991
48. Union of Calif. 15 Feb 1965 4.875 1986
49. Celanese Corp. 18 Aug 1964 3.000 1965
50. National Steel 20 Apr 1971 3.125 1982
51. Gulf and Western 14 Mar 1974 6.000 1988
52. Gulf and Western 14 Mar 1974 7.000A 2003
53. Gulf and Western 14 Mar 1974 7.000B 2003
54. Atlantic Richfield 17 Mar 1976 7.000 1976
55. Atlantic Richfield 17 Mar 1965 8.625 2000
56. Atlantic Richfield 17 Mar 1976 7.000 2000
57. National Steel 20 Apr 1971 4.625 1989
58. Rockwell Int. Corp. 15 Aug 1973 8.500 1995
59. Norton Simon 09 Nov 1972 6.000 1998
60. North Am.. Rockwell 31 Oct 1972 7.300 1977
61. Sears Robuck 13 Apr 1964 4.750 1983
62. Sears Robuck 13 Apr 1964 5.000 1982
63. Sears Robuck 13 Apr 1964 4.625 1972
64. Sears Robuck 13 Apr 1964 4.625 1977
156
Company Name Announcement Day Coupon Maturity
Acquired Bonds Issues
1. Lorillard Corp. 06 Sep 1968 6.625 1993
2. Harrahs Un Inc. 04 Apr 1979 9.500 1996
3. Gamble Skogmo 19 Jun 1980 10.000 1989
4. Ekco Produ. 19 Jul 1965 4.600 1987
5. Carrier Corp. 19 Sep 1978 7.750 1998
6. Carborundum Co. 16 Nov 1977 5.750 1988
7. Carborundum Co. 16 Nov 1977 9.125 2022
8. Carborundum Co. 16 Nov 1977 8.100 2003
9. American Invt. Co. 04 Aug 1980 8.750 1989
10. Lykes 16 Jan 1978 7.500A 1994
11. Lykes 16 Jan 1978 7.500B 1994
12. Lykes 16 Jan 1978 11.000 2000
13. Marcor Inc. 06 Aug 1974 6.500 1988
14. Marathon Oil Co. 20 Nov 1981 8.500 2006
15. Marathon Oil Co. 20 Nov 1981 7.650 1983
16. Marathon Oil Co. 20 Nov 1981 10.250 1987
17. Sinclair Oil Corp. 01 Nov 1968 4.600 1988
18. Standard Packaging 30 Apr 1970 6.000 1990
19. American Teleco. 07 Apr 1978 3.250 1984
20. American Teleco. 07 Apr 1978 4.375 1985
21. American Teleco. 07 Apr 1978 2.625 1968
22. American Teleco. 07 Apr 1978 3.875 1990
23. Colorado Interstate 10 Jul 1972 8.500 1991
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Company Name Announcement Day Coupon Maturity
24. Baldwin Montrose
Acquiring Bonds Issues 
28 Dec 1967 7.100 1972
25. Baldwin Montrose 28 Dec 1967 6.250 1987
26. Essex International 13 Nov 1973 9.250 1975
•r-*CM Chemetron Corp. 02 Sep 1977 9.000 1994
28. Microdot Inc. 16 Jan 1976 10.000 2000
29. Mack Trucks 05 May 1967 5.125 1981
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